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IP anycast is widely used in Internet infrastructure, including many of the root
and top-level DNS servers, major open DNS resolvers, and content delivery networks
(CDNs). Increasing popularity of anycast in DNS resolvers involves it in most
activities of Internet users. As a result, the performance of anycast deployments is
critical to all the Internet users.
What makes IP anycast such an attractive option for these globally replicated
services are the desired properties that anycast would appear to achieve: reduced
overall access latency for clients, improved scalability by distributing traffic across
servers, and enhanced resilience to DDoS attacks. These desired properties, however,
are not guaranteed. In anycast, a packet is directed to certain anycast site through
inter-domain routing, which can fail to pick a route with better performance in
terms of latency or load balance. Prior work has studied anycast deployments
and painted a mixed picture of anycast performance: many clients of anycast are
not served by their nearby anycast servers and experience large latency overheads;
anycast sometimes does not balance load across sites effectively; the catchment of
an anycast site is mostly stable, but it is very sensitive to routing changes.
Although it was observed over a decade ago that anycast deployments can be
inefficient, there exist surprisingly few explanations on the causes or solutions. In ad-
dition, most prior work evaluated only one or several deployments with measurement
snapshots. I extended previous studies by large-scale and longitudinal measurements
towards distinct anycast deployments, which can provide more complete insights on
identifying performance bottlenecks and providing potential improvements. More
importantly, I develop novel measurement techniques to identify the major causes
for inefficiency in anycast, and propose a fix to it. In this dissertation, I defend
the following thesis: Performance-unawareness of BGP routing leads to larger path
inflation in anycast than in unicast; and with current topology and protocol support,
a policy that selects routes based on geographic information could significantly reduce
anycast inflation.
In the first part of the dissertation, I use longitudinal measurements collected
from a large Internet measurement platform towards distinct anycast deployments
to quantitatively demonstrate the inefficiency in performance of anycast. I mea-
sured most root DNS servers, popular open DNS resolvers, and one of the major
CDNs. With the passive and active measurements across multiple years, I illustrate
that anycast performs poorly for most deployments that I measured: anycast is
neither effective at directing queries to nearby sites, nor does it distribute traffic
in a balanced manner. Furthermore, this longitudinal study over distinct anycast
deployments shows that the performance has little correlation with number of sites.
In the second part of the dissertation, I focus on identifying the root causes for
the performance deficits in anycast. I develop novel measurement techniques to com-
pare AS-level routes from client to multiple anycast sites. These techniques allow
me to reaffirm that the major cause of the inefficiency in anycast is the performance-
unawareness of inter-domain routing. With measurements from two anycast deploy-
ments, I illustrate how much latency inflation among clients can be attributed to
the policy-based performance-unaware decisions made by BGP routing. In addi-
tion, I design BGP control plane experiments to directly reveal relative preference
among routes, and how much such preference affects anycast performance. The
newly discovered relative preferences shed light on improving state-of-art models of
inter-domain routing for researchers.
In the last part of the dissertation, I describe an incrementally deployable fix
to the inefficiency of IP anycast. Prior work has proposed a particular deployment
scheme for anycast to improve its performance: anycast servers should be deployed
such that they all share the same upstream provider. However, this solution would
require re-negotiating services that are not working under such a deployment. More-
over, to put the entire anycast service behind a single upstream provider introduces
a single point of failure. In the last chapter, I show that a static hint with embed-
ded geographic information in BGP announcements fixes most of the inefficiency
in anycast. I evaluate the improvements from such static hints in BGP route se-
lection mechanisms through simulation with real network traces. The simulation
results show that the fix is promising: in the anycast deployments I evaluated, the
fix reduces latency inflation for almost all clients, and reduces latency by 50ms for
23% to 33% of the clients. I further conduct control plane experiments to evaluate
the effectiveness of the static hints in BGP announcements with real-world anycast
deployments.
This dissertation provides broad and longitudinal performance evaluation of
distinct anycast deployments for different services, and identifies an at-fault weak-
ness of BGP routing which is particularly amplified in anycast, i.e., route selection is
based on policies and is unaware of performance. While applying the model of BGP
routing to diagnose anycast, anycast itself serves as a magnifying glass to reveal
new insights on the route selection process of the BGP in general. This work can
help refine the model of route selection process that can be applied to various BGP-
related studies. Finally, this dissertation provides suggestions to the community on
improving anycast performance, which thus improves performance and reliability for
many critical Internet infrastructure and ultimately benefits global Internet users.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Anycast is one of the main addressing methods in the Internet Protocol, and is
increasingly used in major network infrastructure. It provides an one-to-any as-
sociation where the packets are routed to any one of a group of receivers that are
all identified by the same destination IP address. Anycast is especially popular
in Domain Name System (DNS) and content delivery networks (CDNs). DNS is
the service that translates human-readable domain names to IP addresses and vice
versa. It is involved in various activities that Internet users do today: browsing web
pages, communicating with each other, conducting online transactions and accessing
emergency services [1, 2]. As of today, all 13 DNS root servers and many popular
open DNS resolvers from providers like Google [3], openDNS [4] and Cloudflare [5],
are hosted via IP anycast. Some content delivery networks use anycast in an at-
tempt to lower latencies and distribute load better. For example, popular sites like
Stack Overflow and Yelp are hosted on Cloudflare’s anycast-based CDNs [5]. As
a result, the performance of anycast deployments is critical to almost all Internet
users.
Large-scale and longitudinal measurements towards anycast deployments can
help network operators and service administrators to evaluate and understand how
1
well their anycast is working, identify performance bottlenecks and potential im-
provements. For example, network attacks, especially distributed Denial-of-Service
(DDoS) attacks can dramatically degrade the performance of the Internet infrastruc-
ture, including anycast-based infrastructure [6]. Comprehensive measurements can
inform us how did the anycast deployments react to DDoS attacks with different
volumes, and help to identify the most affected Internet users. Comparing mea-
surements towards different anycast deployments under similar DDoS attacks can
provide insights on potential improvements. For example, operators should deploy
more hosts at the anycast sites under large pressures during DDoS. And measure-
ments after changes in deployments can help reveal how effective the changes are in
improving anycast performance [7].
The insights obtained from the measurements towards different anycast de-
ployments can benefits multiple parties around the Internet ecosystem, including
service operators, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and users themselves. Service
operators, especially DNS service operators, constantly monitor the quality of their
services [8–10]. They would like to identify any problems around their service and
fast react to them. Also when planning new anycast sites in their deployments, ser-
vice operators use passive and active measurements to understand how to effectively
setup new servers [7,11]. ISPs, especially large transit providers, are more critical to
the performance of anycast deployments than they might be aware of. These mea-
surements can help ISPs identify underlying problems in their local routing policies
that adversely impacts anycast performance. Ultimately, the insights gained from
measuring anycast performance will benefit most Internet users, as their Internet
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activities would probably involve interactions with anycasted services.
Prior work measured anycast-based services, but most of them focused on only
one or several deployments. We previously lack broad and longitudinal analysis of
different anycast deployments. Several prior studies have shown that anycast can
be inefficient, but much to our surprise, there exists few explanations of the causes
of inefficiency or solutions to it.
1.1 Background: what to expect from IP anycast
In anycast, packets are sent to any one instance of a set of replica servers that
are assigned with the same address. The service provided by each replica server is
generally equivalent regardless of the site the server is located [12]. For IP anycast
in particular, replica servers at two or more geographic anycast sites announce the
same IP address through the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the de-facto inter-
domain routing protocol. Packets are directed to one of the replica servers through
BGP routes, and senders have no control over which server receives them.
A service may use anycast for a variety of reasons. Several desired properties
of anycast deployments are:
• Performance: Anycast can help to reduce overall access latency for clients,
by providing them geographic proximity to reduce network distance between
clients and the server.
• Scalability: Anycast infrastructure distributes (coarsely) traffic load across a
set of replicas, which allows infrastructure to scale to handle increased traffic
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and to accommodate traffic peaks.
• Reliability: Anycast can mitigate distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks
by constraining attacks to the catchment of anycast sites. The catchment of an
anycast site is the topological region of the Internet from which packets towards
the anycast address are directed to the site. Anycast catchment also provides
information to help identify the sources of attacks where traffic originated with
spoofed addresses.
These properties that IP anycast would appear to achieve make it an attractive
option for globally replicated service deployments. Anycast is widely used in critical
Internet infrastructures, including many of root and top-level DNS servers, major
open DNS resolvers, and some content delivery networks (CDNs).
The desired properties of anycast, however, are not guaranteed. The anycast
server chosen to provide service to certain clients is determined by BGP routing,
which lacks mechanisms to pick routes with better performance in terms of latency or
geographic proximity, load balance, and catchment stability. Nonetheless, network
operators expect anycast generally achieves the properties, as evidenced by the
increasing deployments of root DNS servers and open resolvers [10,13–15].
In this dissertation, I use the following anycast-related terminologies: Anycast
address is the IP address announced from different physical locations across the
Internet, called sites. Each site may have one or more servers, called replicas. For
a specific anycast deployment, a given site is either local or global. Replicas at local
sites are often announced with no-export BGP community to prevent the hosting
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AS from announcing them to peers. Local replicas are available only within the
hosting AS or its customers. Global replicas have no such constraints and can be
accessed across the Internet.
1.2 Prior approaches and remaining challenges
Prior studies have measured various anycast services, but few provided insights on
the root causes of anycast inefficiencies.
In Chapter 2, I place the problem of evaluating and improving IP anycast
in the context of related work, and describe the prior results. These work has
measured many different anycast services (e.g., DNS roots and CDNs), and evalu-
ated the performance of anycast mainly from three aspects: latency or geographic
proximity [7, 9, 16–21], load distribution [6, 11, 18, 20, 22], and catchment stabil-
ity [16,18–20,22,23]
However, prior results painted a mixed picture of anycast performance: the
deployment of anycast reduces overall latency for clients, but many clients were not
served by their nearby anycast servers and experienced large latency overheads; while
catchment is generally stable in anycast, it is also quite sensitive to routing changes;
anycast sometimes does not balance load across instances effectively. Some prior
work has suggested the significant impact of BGP routing on anycast performance
degrading, but unfortunately, little work has been done to fix the problem.
Ballani et al. [18,24] claimed that the lack of metrics in route selection mecha-
nisms to identify the better route is the cause for anycast inefficiency, and proposed
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one way to fix the inefficiency: anycast instances should be deployed such that they
all share the same upstream provider. This solution suggests that cooperation with
a large global ISP is a prerequisite to have efficient anycast-based services. For ser-
vices that are not working under such deployment, it requires negotiating with their
providers to implement the fix. Also, this deployment scheme introduces a single
point of failure (the single upstream provider) in anycast, and makes anycast more
vulnerable to interruptions in the provider.
1.3 Thesis
The goal of this dissertation is to identify the major causes for inefficiency in anycast,
and to propose a potential fix. To achieve the goal, I develop active probing methods
to obtain large-scale and longitudinal measurements towards various anycast deploy-
ments. In this dissertation, I defend the following thesis: Performance-unawareness
of BGP routing leads to larger path inflation in anycast than in unicast; and with
current topology and protocol support, a policy that selects routes based on geographic
information could significantly reduce anycast inflation.
• Policy-based performance-unaware Inter-domain routing: Inter-domain rout-
ing protocol selects routes to forward packets based mainly on routing policies,
and has no mechanisms to identify the routes with better performance.




To demonstrate this thesis, I conduct in-depth analysis of distinct IP anycast deploy-
ments (Chapter 3), including different DNS servers and CDNs. I then investigate
the prevalent inefficiencies among anycast deployments, and identify the root causes
for performance problems (Chapter 4): routes lack of useful information to identify
routes to nearby, low-latency anycast sites. I find that ASes usually receive routes
that are “equivalent” based on the state-of-art model for inter-domain routing, and
the ASes cannot identify routes to closer sites. However, I develop experiments to
reveal that relative preference exists among the “equivalent” routes (Chapter 5).
Finally, I propose how to improve anycast efficiency and evaluate the benefits with
simulations (Chapter 6). My contributions are organized as the following:
Chapter 3: Evaluating anycast performance
Using passive and active measurements of distinct, DNS anycast deployments,
I quantify the inefficiency of IP anycast, in terms of both latency and load balance.
While prior results showed that IP anycast might not be optimal, I find that over
20% of clients traveled an extra 2000km (over the distances to their closest anycast
instances) for most of the measured anycast deployments. Contradicting suggestions
in prior work, I use measurements collected from real anycast deployments to show
that adding anycast instances often increases overall latency for clients. Further,
I describe algorithms to characterize influential routing changes that cause perfor-
mance shifts in anycast, and a heuristic on identifying the causes of such routing
changes.
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Chapter 4: Diagnosing anycast performance problems
I develop a novel measurement technique to compare the AS-level paths from
vantage points to multiple anycast instances. My results verify that the major cause
of anycast inefficiency is the performance-unawareness property of inter-domain
routing: route selection mechanisms lack of useful information to identify the better
route, thus often choose route towards a distant, high-latency anycast instance.
For the two anycast deployments that experienced large latency inflation, over 40%
and 65% of the clients, respectively, were directed to distant instances due to poor
routing selections among routes with equivalent preference based on current model
of inter-domain routing.
Chapter 5: Inferring provider preferences via route manipulations
I design control plane experiments and use large-scale data plane measure-
ments to directly identify relative preference among routes. My experiments ex-
pose the ISPs behavior on selecting Tier-1 providers when multiple of them provide
valid routes. Research on interdomain routing has been relying on Gao-Rexford
model [25, 26] When the model cannot determine the favorable route, it is com-
monly assumed that a route is selected the equally good ones by the “Shortest AS
path” policy. My experiments illustrate that ISPs usually have “local preference”
towards providers before taking shortest paths. More surprisingly, I show that Tier-
2 ISPs have common and consistent preferences among Tier-1 ISPs, even when they
have the same provider-customer relations. Another important implication from
the result is that “Shortest AS path” policy might be applied less often than people
expected. My result shows that only about half of the Tier-2 ISPs choose shorter
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paths from Tier-1 providers. Fortunately, such preference does not cause additional
inefficiencies in anycast: it causes about 16.7% of the queries to be sent to farther
anycast sites, while 19.2% of the queries to closer sites.
Chapter 6: Improving anycast performance
Instead of deploying all anycast instances such that they all share the same up-
stream provider [18,24], I propose to add geographic hints in BGP announcements.
Through the proposed static hints, BGP routers can identify the route towards
(geographically) nearby anycast instance, thus reduce latency inflation. I evaluate
the benefits of such static hints by simulating the route selection process with real
traces. The results show that this fix reduces latency inflation for almost all clients,
and reduces latency by 50 ms for 23% to 33% of the clients in the two anycast
deployments evaluated. I further evaluate the propagation of the static hints in the
Internet using a real-world anycast deployment [27].
Chapter 7: Conclusion and future work
I conclude this dissertation with a summary of contributions. First, this dis-
sertation provides a comprehensive and longitudinal performance measurements of
distinct anycast deployments. Second, this measurement-based study identifies that
the performance-unaware route selection policies in BGP are the major causes for
inefficiencies in anycast. Although this weakness of BGP routing is known to re-
searchers, it is amplified in anycast scenarios. Furthermore, measuring anycast
reveals new insights on route selection process of the BGP. This finding helps the
research community refine the model of BGP routing that can be applied to vari-
ous BGP-related studies. In addition, this dissertation provides suggestions to the
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Internet community on improving anycast performance. Ultimately, these contribu-
tions help improve performance and reliability of critical Internet infrastructure and
thus benefit global Internet users. In the end, I discuss directions for future work in
improving anycast deployments.
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Chapter 2: Related Work
2.1 Performance measurements of IP anycast
Much prior work has evaluated the performance of anycast from three aspects:
latency, catchment stability and load distribution. In those measurement studies,
CDNs and DNS root servers are the popular targets because of their importance
as fundamental Internet infrastructure, and the fact that anycast is widely used to
provide such services.
2.1.1 Path inflation in IP anycast
Several studies have used RTTs as the metric to evaluate IP anycast. They compared
the RTTs between clients to the anycast address with the lowest RTT among the
RTTs from clients to all anycast sites [7, 9, 16–19].
As early as in 2006, Sarat et al. [16] conducted such measurements to F- and
K-root using Planetlab hosts [28]. They showed that the deployment of anycast
reduces average query latency, and that majority (over 50%) of the queries were
served by anycast servers with low (< 20ms) latency overheads compared to the
lowest-latency server. Anycast deployment of the K-root DNS server is studied by
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Colitti et al. [9] in the same year with RIPE’s traffic measurements service [29],
and concluded with similar results. More recently in 2013, Liang et al. [17] applied
King latency inference technique [30] to measure latencies between about 20K open
recursive resolvers and root DNS servers. Their results, however, showed that about
40% of the resolvers were routed to anycast sites more than 50ms farther away from
the lowest latency anycast sites. Calder et al. [19] measured an anycast-based CDN
with embedded JavaScript in Bing search responses, and they reported that anycast
usually performed well, although it directed 20% of clients to suboptimal sites.
Other studies have used geographic distance as a metric to evaluate how well
anycast performs. In 2007, Liu et al. [20] evaluated C-, F- and K-root with two
days’ DNS traffic, and reported that queries traveled an extra 5000 km longer than
to geographically closest anycast site from about 60%, 40% and 40% of the clients
for C-, F-, and K-root DNS servers, respectively. Recently in 2015, Kuipers [21]
conducted a 10 minute measurement of K-root’s anycast performance, and showed
that over 45% of clients are not directed to their geographically closest anycast site.
Previous results painted a mixed picture of anycast performance among all
the different anycast deployments measured from different sets of vantage points:
overall, anycast reduces access latency for clients; however, usually about 30% of
clients experienced large latency overheads for using sub-optimal anycast servers. In
this dissertation, I perform an in-depth and longitudinal analysis of over 10 distinct
anycast deployments, and quantify the inefficiencies of anycast performance.
In much of the prior work [9, 16, 31], people suggested that more anycast
instances improve the overall latency for clients. In a most recent study in 2016,
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however, Schmidt et al. [7] stated that having “as few as twelve sites” is enough
to provide reasonable performance as having many sites. Our results qualitatively
support this statement in the sense that adding more anycast instances does not
improve, but in fact harms the performance in many anycast deployments. We
further show that it is a common problem for anycast deployments that they are
unable to fully utilize the performance that could be realized, and more importantly
identify the root causes of these inefficiencies.
2.1.2 Route stability for IP anycast
Some Internet services (e.g., video streaming) require stateful connections between
clients and servers for a long time. Since the routing system determines the anycast
instance selection on behalf of clients, for such services to be provided reliably over
anycast, route stability is expected.
Internet routing stability is an important property studied extensively in previ-
ous work [32–38], including pioneering work by Paxson [39], in which they analyzed
routing failures, loops, symmetry and stability using large-scale end-to-end mea-
surements Much prior work evaluated the impact of routing instability on network
latency. In 2006, Wang et al. [40] and Pucha et al. [41] presented first work that quan-
tified the effect of routing change on network latency after route convergence. By
analyzing a diverse set of end-to-end paths, they concluded that route changes hap-
pen frequently between hosts, and most path changes caused small latency change.
Schwartz et al. [42–44] conducted large-scale longitudinal measurements on end-to-
13
end latency change due to routing dynamics, and found similar results. In addition,
their longitudinal analysis showed that the (in-)stability of routes remained similar
in the years they conducted their experiments. Many methods on identifying and
diagnosing route changes were proposed [45–52]. My work differs from the prior
work with the focus on the impact of route instability on IP anycast. Our initial re-
sults suggest that routing changes caused larger latency variation in anycast: route
changes in anycast could lead clients to distant anycast instances.
More specific to anycast, other prior work studied the catchment stability
to anycast sites: how often clients change their directed sites. These studies [11,
16, 18–20, 22] used a special type of DNS queries—hostname.bind. TXT record—to
identify the anycast instance used by each client, and detected anycast instance
swaps. A similar conclusion was drawn from the prior work: IP anycast typically
offers stable catchment to most clients; only a small fraction (< 5%) of clients
experience frequent swaps, usually due to per-packet load balancing. In a recent
study in 2018, Wei et al. [23] confirmed the common understanding that catchment
is generally stable in anycast, and identified a small set of clients that are affected by
per-packet load balancing. Hiebert et al. [53,54] proposed to use catchment stability
in DNS anycast as an indicator for detecting routing instability. Their evaluation
showed their method to be promising: about 61% of the significant routing events
were detected by instance swaps in anycast. We did not try to re-examine the
catchment stability of anycast, nor to use anycast to detect route instability. With
longitudinal analysis on different anycast deployments, we characterize the impact
of routing changes on anycast performance, and identify the root causes for the
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routing changes in Chapter 3.
2.1.3 Load distribution among anycast sites
Anycast is expected to distribute (coarsely) traffic load across instances, and thus
to handle traffic peaks and to mitigate DDoS attacks. In 2006, Ballani et al. [18]
showed that IP anycast does not balance client load across anycast instances, and
proposed a mechanism through AS-Path prepending and traffic engineering with
the anycast providers to coarsely control the traffic distribution. Other work [20,22]
examined server logs of DNS roots, and observed very large variability in traffic
loads on anycast servers. de Vries et al. [11] provided a new approach to measure
anycast catchment and estimate traffic load across anycast instances. Recently in
2016, Moura et al. [6] studied anycast under the pressure of a particular DDoS
attack against DNS roots in November and December 2015. They showed that
although anycast is overall resilient to DDoS attacks, some anycast instances can
become overloaded and result in collateral damage to other instances. Our results
largely reinforce these prior results by showing that anycast does not balance load
effectively. In Chapter 5, I conduct an experiment that examine if certain Tier-1
ISPs are preferred by customer ISPs, which might causes queries through the Tier-1
ISPs are “funneled” to few anycast sites, thus cause out-of-balance load distribution.
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2.2 Explaining and fixing IP anycast performance
Many of the above measurement studies suggest that BGP routing has large impact
on whether clients receive low-latency, stable services, but have provided little ex-
planation or fix. A case study from Bellis [55] used active measurements to identify
and fix a specific latency issue in F-root caused by route leaks. Ballani et al. [18]
is the closest work to ours in identifying the root causes of large latency inflation
(or what they refer to as the “stretch-factor”) for anycast clients; they claimed that
current route selection mechanisms lack of metrics to identify the route with low
latency, thus have a high chance of making poor choice of anycast server. Our mea-
surement study on multiple anycast deployments verifies their claim. Furthermore,
our results quantify the effects of poor routing decisions on latency inflation, and
attribute latency inflation to incurred by each of the common routing policies (e.g.,
prefer customer-over-peer-over-provider, prefer shortest AS Path).
Ballani et al. [18, 24] hypothesized that deploying the anycast instances such
that they all share the same upstream provider is one approach to account for route
selection problem, and thus remedy latency inflation in IP anycast. We find that
C-root has such deployment, and confirm this hypothesis by showing that C-root
clients do not suffer from the poor route selection issues. However, most anycast ser-
vices are not deployed in this fashion, and changing deployments requires significant
amount of work in negotiating with providers. More importantly, deploying anycast
instances under a single upstream provider introduces a single point of failure, makes
anycast less resilient to DDoS attacks. In Chapter ??, we propose a easily deploy-
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able fix: adding static hints in BGP announcements, that enables BGP’s ability to
identify the route towards nearby anycast instance. Our evaluation shows that such
static hints improve latency performance for most clients.
There are other proposals [24, 56–58] on improving anycast to achieve better
load balancing among instances. In this dissertation, we do not directly address
the load balance problem in anycast, rather we conduct experiments in attempts
to identify the cause of unbalanced load. Furthermore, our proposed static hints in
BGP improves geo-proximity for the clients, which ensures traffic is distributed to
nearby instances.
2.3 Interdomain routing models and route manipulations
Anycast relies on interdomain routing to direct packets to nearby replicas. Much
prior work studied on how to model interdomain policies. Huston [59,60] presented
seminal work on classifying relations between ISPs and introduced the economic con-
siderations in interdomain routing policy. Griffin et al. [61,62] studied the problem
of identifying stable paths by modeling BGP policies and connectivities. The current
model of interdomain routing policies was developed by Gao and Rexford [25, 26]
based on prior work. This model classifies relations between ISPs into customer-
provider, where the customer pays the provider, and peer-peer, where the peers
exchange traffic without cost. Also this model provides insights on local preferences
based on the costs: An ISP prefers routes through a neighboring customer, then
routes through a neighboring peer, and then routes through a providers; i.e., ISPs
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prefer cheaper routes. This model has been used to simulate interdomain routing
paths selections in myriad studies on analyzing network reliability [63], BGP con-
vergence [64], control of network traffic [65–68], and BGP security [69–71]. Many
tools like BSIM [72], BGPSIM [73], QUICKSAND [74] were developed assuming
the Gao-Rexford model to predict BGP routing paths. In these simulation tools,
the shortest paths among the ones satisfying the model are assumed preferable, and
other tie-breakers might be applied to determine the unique path. In this disserta-
tion, I assess how often the rule of preferring shortest paths is actually used by ISPs
when selecting next-hop providers.
While used in many studies, it is known that the Gao-Rexford misses some
aspects of the interdomain routing. Researchers tried to improve the model by iden-
tifying hybrid and partial transit relationships between ISPs [75], providing finer
granularity for preference ranking of neighboring ISPs [76], addressing the effect of
intra-domain routing policies on interdomain routes [77], etc. Gill et al. [78] con-
ducted a survey of about 100 network operators for their BGP routing policies, and
reported that most ISPs follow the Gao-Rexford model in setting local preferences
and exporting routes. Anwar et al. [79] identified cases where empirically observed
routes violate either the Gao-Rexford model or the assumption of preferring short-
est paths. They attribute these violations to causes arising from prefix-specific
policies, hybrid and partial transit relationships, and geography-based policies. In
this dissertation, I use measurements to reveal local preferences among providers of
multi-homed ISPs, and to evaluate how often such preferences overwrites the short-
est path assumptions. My results provide complementary aspects to Gao-Rexford
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model. Furthermore, I evaluate the impact of such local preferences among providers
on the performance of anycast: although unaware of the routing performance, these
local preferences do not particularly increase anycast inflations.
Route manipulations, especially BGP poisoning, have been used as measure-
ment methods to discover hidden network topology [80], to evaluate the prevalence
of default routing [81] and to identify alternate back-up paths in the Internet [79].
Researchers have also proposed to use BGP poisoning as a mechanism to reroute
traffic and avoid congestion links under DDoS attacks [82–84]. I augment route poi-
soning’s ability to reveal local preferences with other mechanisms, including remote
traffic engineering with community tags and selective AS-path (un-)prepending.
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Chapter 3: Evaluating Anycast Performance
In this chapter, I aim to answer the following question: Does anycast actually
achieve the desired properties (described in Chapter 1) that it seems to have in
performance, scalability and reliability? 1 I describe work with colleagues which
studies whether anycast is effective at achieving the properties through evaluation
on the performance of many distinct anycast deployments. Also, the longitudinal
measurements I collected provide insights on the benefit of adding anycast sites:
how does anycast improves its performance as new sites were deployed? Further,
I analyze the impact of routing instability on anycast, and present a heuristic on
identifying the causes of routing changes that trigger significant performance shifts
in anycast.
3.1 Dataset overview
I measured DNS root servers and major open resolvers to analyze the performance
of Internet-wide anycast deployments.
1Evaluating and improving anycast resilience is not within the scope of this dissertation; how-
ever, we believe the dynamic hints described in Chapter 6 can be used to mitigate the effect of
large-scale attacks like those that took place Nov. 30 and Dec. 1, 2015 [6, 85].
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Root Operator Number of sites Number of global sites
A Verisign Inc. 15 15
B ISI 2 2
C Cogent Comm. 10 10
D Univ. of Maryland 148 23
E NASA (Ames) 196 95
F ISC Inc. 187 107
G US Dept. of Defense 6 6
H US Army 2 2
I Netnod 61 59
J Verisign Inc. 123 71
K RIPE NCC 62 61
L ICANN 145 145
M WIDE Project 5 4
Table 3.1: Root server overview, current as of April 2019.
3.1.1 DNS root servers overview
The DNS root service has been distributed over thirteen root servers, each referred
to by a “letter”, A-root through M-root. These root servers are assigned to thirteen
Internet (IPv4) addresses, and operated by different entities. Over the past decades,
all root servers have been anycasted, replicating DNS root service over hundreds of
sites all over the globe. The same root address may be (and often is) announced
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Operator Respond to CHAOS Number of sites
Google No 28
OpenDNS Yes 32
Cloudflare(Quad One) Yes 174
Table 3.2: Popular DNS open resolvers overview, current as of April 2019.
through different ASes. In this dissertation, I consider each root to be an separate
anycast deployment, and examine their performance independently. Table 3.1 lists
the operators, and the number of global and local sites for each DNS root server
in April 2019. Data in the table are from http://root-servers.org. In this
dissertation, I study 9 out of 13 roots that have at least 5 anycast global sites. 2
3.1.2 Major DNS resolvers overview
Many popular open DNS resolvers are anycasted. I focus on the anycast resolvers
provided by Google [3], OpenDNS [86], Cloudflare [5]. They are the most popular
open resolvers that are used by millions of people around the world everyday. These
open resolvers replicate DNS recursive resolver service over hundreds of sites, and
announce resolvers’ addresses through different ASes. Table 3.2 lists the operators,
and the number of sites for each of the major open resolvers as in April 2019. For
these open resolvers, we consider all of their anycast sites are global.
2G-root does not respond to “hostname.bin” DNS CHAOS queries with meaningful identifiers
that we use to distinguish sites. See section 3.1.3 for more details.
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3.1.3 Passive and active measurements
Two different datasets are used in the analyses: traffic traces collected from sites of
D-root server, and active measurements from RIPE Atlas probes. In the rest of this
section, I describe these datasets and their features.
3.1.3.1 D-root server traffic traces
The first dataset is sampled traffic traces collected from all sites of D-root. D-root is
operated by the University of Maryland. As of April, D-root had over 143 anycast
sites, 23 of which were global and the rest local. Roughly 20% of all traffic at each
site is collected. The analysis in this dissertation used longitudinal D-root traffic
data collected on everyday from 2016 to 2018. On average, during these years, D-
root received more than 30, 000 queries per second, resulting in about 140 GB of
data per day.
This passive collection of DNS traffic provides us a global, detailed view of
clients activity and query distribution seen at D-root. Also, this dataset shows traffic
load distribution and variance among anycast sites, which allows us to evaluate the
effectiveness of load balance in anycast.
However, this dataset represents only D-root, one out of 13 DNS roots. Since
other DNS roots have different number of anycast sites and provider ASes, the
performance evaluation based on this dataset does not immediately generalize to
other anycast deployments. Also, this passively collected dataset does not provide
insight into how the queries were directed to sites and route selection process. In
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order to expand the analysis to other anycast deployments, and to better understand
the interaction between anycast and BGP routing, I augment D-root dataset with
active measurements conducted by RIPE Atlas platform.
3.1.3.2 RIPE Atlas measurements
The RIPE Atlas framework [87,88] contains∼10,000 active probes distributed across
181 countries and in ∼3621 ASes as of April 2019. Each probe periodically executes
pre-defined measurements, referred to “build-in measurements”, that include specific
DNS queries, pings and traceroutes to all 13 DNS root servers. The analysis focuses
on two specific “build-in measurements”: DNS CHAOS queries and traceroutes.
We refer DNS CHAOS query to the approach supported by BIND implemen-
tation of the DNS protocol suite to identify a particular server. Specifically, a DNS
query for a TXT record in Class CHAOS (as opposed to the common case, Class In-
ternet) for the domain name “hostname.bind.” will return a unique identifier for the
responding server, which is configured by the name server operator. For example, a
typical response to DNS CHAOS query from D-root is “mcva2.droot”. The record
in this response indicates that the responding server is D-root replica #2 located in
McLean, Virginia. F-root replica that returns responses with identifier “yyz1f.f.root-
servers.org” is the F-root replica ‘1f’ located in Toronto, Canada. 12 out of 13 DNS
root servers are configured to provide a unique identifier for each replica: G-root
does not respond meaningful identifiers that distinguish sites. Among the 12 roots
configured with meaningful identifiers, I analyze measurements that the RIPE Atlas
24
probes sent to 9 of them that have at least five global anycast sites. Each active
RIPE Atlas probe sends DNS CHAOS queries to each DNS root server’s anycast ad-
dress, every 4 minutes. These measurements enables the analysis that tracks which
particular replica each probe is directed to by BGP routing at a given time during
the three years.
Along with DNS CHAOS queries, RIPE Atlas probes also send a traceroute
to each DNS root’s anycast address every 30 minutes. This traceroute measurement
allows us to map the AS paths taken by queries from the probes to DNS root servers.
In this dissertation, I analyzed these measurements collected by all probes in
about 4 years (March 2015 to March 2019). Prior work [8, 54] has used the same
measurements to evaluate latency and client affinity. In my analysis, I augment these
datasets with novel measurement methodologies that evaluate possible alternate
routes towards different sites (in Chapter 4).
3.2 How does anycast perform for D-root?
In this section, I analyze the sampled traffic traces collected from D-root sites, and
evaluate the performance of D-root anycast deployment.
Figure 3.1a and 3.1a shows what fraction of queries or clients are directed to
anycast sites ranked by distance to the sources, in July 2018 and March 2019. For
each query received at D-root, I geo-locate the source address of the query using the
MaxMind database [89]. Then, I compute the distance from the query source to the
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(d) Distribution of D-root queries by ex-
tra distance traveled, as in March 2019.
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(b) D-root load in March 2019.
Figure 3.2: D-root load distribution
is ranked as 0, the second closest as 1, and so on. I compute the same measure for
each source IP address (per client) as well. Figure 3.1a and 3.1b shows that only
about 40 % of queries or clients to D-root were directed to geographically closest
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site; About 10 % to the second closest site. Another 30 % of all queries or clients
were directed to sites ranked 5 or higher.
While Figure 3.1a and 3.1b reports that about 2/3 of all queries or clients
are somehow “misdirected” by routing protocols to non-closest anycast site, it is
possible that the higher rank sites are close to the clients as well. I evaluate the
cost of inefficiency by measuring the extra distance that queries traveled to reach
their anycast sites, over the geo-closest ones. Figure 3.1c and 3.1d shows that about
1/3rd of the queries traveled over 1000km more than minimal, and around 10.0%
traveled more 5000km extra.
Geographic distance has been proven to be a reasonable approximation of
expected latency [90]. The traffic dataset collected at D-root sites does not provide
a direct measure of query latency. For various reasons, the geographically closest
site may not be the site with lowest latency. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, I will
quantify the anycast inefficiency and how much it can be improved not just for
geographic proximity, but for measured latency as well. However, that analysis
is based on traceroute and DNS CHAOS measurements from RIPE Atlas probes
instead of DNS traffic at D-root.
From these results, compiled across over years (2018 and 2019), from over 102
billion queries and 35 million IP addresses per year, representing over 190 countries.
I conclude that there is substantial room for improving latency or geographic prox-
imity performance in anycast for D-root. Maybe it is the case that the ineffective
geographic proximity in anycast is to provide balanced query distribution among
sites. Next, I characterize traffic load distribution on D-root sites.
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Figure 3.2 shows the measures of load balance on D-root. The x-axis lists
global sites of D-root; y-axis represents the fraction of total queries. Two different
measures of load balance are considered, derived by comparing actual load distri-
bution to two scenarios in where load is reasonably balanced. One scenario is the
even load distribution, i.e., each site receives an equal amount of queries. The “Over
even distribution” bars show fraction of queries, over (or under) the even distribu-
tion received by each site. In July 2018, for instance, Figure 3.2a shows that the
mcva site received 10.0% of total queries more than its “fair share”, whereas the
dftx received 3.9% less. The other is the scenario when all queries were directed to
their geographically closet site. The “Over closest” bars show the difference between
such query distribution and the actual distribution. In July 2018, we see that mcva
received as much as 14.4% of total queries more than it would have, if all queries
had been directed to their closest site; amnl, cpmd and ffde also each received ex-
tra queries as much as 8% of total queries. During the same time, however, viat
received 11.3% fewer queries. Figure 3.2b shows that queries distribution is still not
balanced. Figure 3.2a and 3.2b show that query distribution among D-root sites is
out of balance by different measures at different times.
The above results show that anycast performs poorly for D-root: it is neither
effective at directing queries to nearby sites, nor does it distribute traffic in a bal-
anced manner. Is it that anycast does not perform well only for D-root, or these
tends generalize to other anycast deployments? In the next section, I utilize RIPE
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(c) Comparison of clients in D-root data
and RIPE Atlas probes from US-only.
Figure 3.3: D-root clients vs. RIPE-Atlas probes: Extra distance traveled in July
2018
3.3 Are RIPE Atlas measurements biased?
The D-root traffic traces provide a global, unbiased sample of DNS clients distribu-
tion over the world, and their query volume. Unfortunately, I do not have access to
traffic traces collected on other DNS roots or anycast services. Instead, I analyze ac-
tive measurements conducted from RIPE Atlas probes to evaluate the performance
of anycast for other DNS roots.
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D-root Data (US) RIPE Atlas Data (US)
(c) Comparison of clients in D-root data
and RIPE Atlas probes from US-only.
Figure 3.4: D-root clients vs. RIPE-Atlas probes: Extra distance traveled in March
2019.
services measured from about 10,000 probes. The location of RIPE Atlas probes
is publicly available. However they are biased towards Europe and the United
States [91]. Hence, before the results based on the RIPE Atlas measurements are
generalized, the bias of the data should be evaluated. The D-root data serve as a
“ground truth” for how queries are distributed across anycast sites, and I evaluate
the bias by comparing results based on RIPE Atlas data with the results derived
from the D-root data.
Specifically, I measure the extra distance distribution (as in Figure 3.1c and 3.1d)
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for queries from RIPE Atlas probes to D-root, and compare it with the result from
D-root data. For RIPE Atlas probes, their locations are publicly available [91], and
I identify the D-root sites they were directed to with the DNS CHAOS queries.
Figure 3.3 and 3.4 shows data over one week from both RIPE Atlas probes and
D-root traces in 2018 and 2019 respectively. Due to the concentration of RIPE Atlas
probes in Europe and United States, in addition to the overall result, Figure 3.3b
and 3.4c plot the results specifically for queries from these two regions.
From Figure 3.3 and 3.4 we see that the results from RIPE Atlas measurements
do not correspond well with the “ground truth” distribution based on D-root data.
This shows that the results from RIPE Atlas measurements do not correspond well
with the “ground truth” distribution derived from D-root data. The RIPE Atlas
probes do not represent global clients distribution for D-root, especially outside of
Europe. However, it is worth noting that in all cases, the results from RIPE Atlas
probes overestimate the performance of anycast for D-root. Since the global clients
distribution and activities for D-root should be similar to that of other DNS roots,
I believe it is reasonable to evaluate the performance of anycast for different DNS
roots. The performance in reality should be worse than results evaluated from RIPE
Atlas measurements, as illustrated by the evaluation on D-root.
3.4 How does anycast perform for other roots?
In this section, I show in Figure 3.5 and 3.6 the extra distance measure for three





























































































All EU US Other
(c) L-root
Figure 3.5: Distribution of RIPE-Atlas queries over extra distance (compared to
their closest sites) traveled in July 2018.
roots are shown in Figure 8.1 and 8.2 in Chapter 8. The three roots are different
anycast deployments operated by various entities: as in March 2019, C-root has 10
global sites; K-root contains 61 global sites; L-root has the largest number, 145,
global anycast sites. I focus on C-, K- and L-root, along with D-root, because they
are the ones with good unicast representative addresses for their sites, as shown in
Section 4.2.
K- and L-root, operated by RIPE NCC. and ICANN, respectively, show per-
formance similar to D-root. Also similar to D-root, the inefficient performance of K-





























































































All EU US Other
(c) L-root
Figure 3.6: Distribution of RIPE-Atlas queries over extra distance (compared to
their closest sites) traveled in March 2019.
Cogent, performs better than the other two, as well as D-root. It is expected that
C-root performs well, since queries to C-root are largely directed to proper site by
intra-domain routing. I have the following hypothesis to explain the better perfor-
mance in C-root: The anycast service of C-root is provided through Cogent, a Tier-1
ISP with broad coverage and numerous peering points with other ISPs. Due to the
vast usage of “early-exit” routing policy, most queries to C-root will be sent along a
path that traverses providers without much of detour and enter Cogent at a nearby
peering point. Once in Cogent’s network, queries are direct to their sites based on































































(b) In March 2019.
Figure 3.7: Distribution of RIPE-Atlas queries to Google open resolver over extra
distance (compared to their closest sites) traveled.
unlikely that queries are directed to distant sites due to poor inter-domain routing
selection, which is the main cause of inefficiency of anycast for other roots as shown
in Chapter 4.
These results derived from RIPE Atlas measurements suggest that the per-
formance deficit experienced by D-root is not special, but indeed representative of
current anycast deployments. In Chapter 4, I describe novel techniques to investi-
gate the causes for such inefficiency in anycast.
3.5 How does anycast perform on open DNS resolvers?
Anycast is becoming more and more popular in the Internet. Other than DNS roots,
major open DNS resolvers are also built upon anycast. For example, open recursive
resolvers hosted by Google (i.e., 8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4), OpenDNS (i.e., 208.67.220.220,
208.67.220.222) and Cloudflare (i.e., 1.1.1.1, 1.0.0.1), are all anycasted. Unlike root































































(b) In March 2019.
Figure 3.8: Distribution of RIPE-Atlas queries to Cloudflare open resolver over extra






























































(b) In March 2019.
Figure 3.9: Distribution of RIPE-Atlas queries to OpenDNS open resolver over extra
distance (compared to their closest sites) traveled.
of users. Since DNS is involved in most daily activities of normal Internet users, the
performance of the anycast deployments underlies these open resolvers is critical to
almost all Internet users.
In this section, I evaluate the performance of anycast deployments under those
open resolvers, and analyze if they experience similar problems as the DNS roots
do. To conduct similar evaluations as in the last section, there are two requirements
to the target anycast deployments:
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• I need to be able to Identify the anycast site each query is sent to. For example,
I use CHAOS queries to identify anycast site in DNS root servers.
• I need to know the locations of all sites in the anycast deployment.
Only with these requirements, I can evaluate how far away the queries are sent to,
and whether nearby sites are present.
Fortunately, three major open DNS resolvers satisfy both requirements: Google,
OpenDNS and Cloudflare’s Quad One. Both OpenDNS and Cloudflare respond to
DNS CHAOS queries, from which I obtain identifiers that can locate the respond-
ing anycast sites. Meanwhile, these two open resolvers publish the locations of all
their anycast sites [4, 5]. Googles open resolvers do not support CHAOS query
(or similar queries). But Google publishes the unicast IP address ranges for its
open resolvers to forward queries to authoritative DNS servers, and associated loca-
tions [3]. From the authoritative server’s side, it identifies which anycast sites send
the queries by source addresses. Based on this property of Google open resolver,
I design the following technique to identify which site receives each query. I set
up an authoritative DNS server for a domain that we control: “scriptroute.org”.
This server responds queries for random sub-domains of “scriptroute.org” with the
source addresses of the queries. For example, when the server receives a query for
“<random string>.scriptroute.org” from address a.b.c.d, it will respond with a.b.c.d
in the answer section. When I send queries for “<random string>.scriptroute.org”
through Google open resolver, the response will be the unicast address that used
to forward my queries to “scriptroute.org” authoritative server. I can then identify
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which site of Google resolver receive my query by mapping the unicast address in
the response to its associated location. To increase the chance that open resolver
forwards queries to the authoritative server, I set the TTL value in the response to
be one second. Table 3.2 lists the open resolvers that I measure and their features.
Figure 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 show the extra distance measure for the three open
resolvers in November 2018 and in March 2019. All measurements are performed
from RIPE Atlas probes. To balance measurement coverage and cost, I select one
RIPE-Atlas probe from each (AS, country) tuple: about 3,100 probes are used in
the measurements. These results provide a measure of the cost of misdirection,
by quantifying the extra distance queries that are not directed to the closest site
must travel. In Figure 3.7, over 20% of the queries to Google resolvers travel over
1000 km more than minimal, and over 8.0% travel more than 5000 km extra. The
performance remains similar in the two measurements. I observe similar performance
for OpenDNS resolvers, as shown in Figure 3.9. Anycast performance for Google and
OpenDNS resolvers are slightly better than D-root, but there are still more 15% of
queries directed more than 1,000 KMs away from the closest sites. Cloudflare open
resolver seems to be more efficient than Google and OpenDNS. Figure 3.8 shows
that bout 90% of queries are directed to nearby sites (e.g., less 1,000 KMs extra
distance).
Although these open resolvers appear to have better anycast performance than
the DNS root servers, there is room to improve. Consider the number of clients these
resolvers serve, improving anycast performance for even 10% of the clients to the














































































































































































(b) Fraction of RIPE Atlas probes directed to a site within 500km of
the geographically nearest.
Figure 3.10: How the number of global anycast sites affects performance.
longitudinal measurements to see if anycast benefits from adding more sites.
3.6 Does adding more anycast sites improve performance?
By tracking the number of anycast sites for each root, and analyzing RIPE Atlas
measurements from 2017 to 2019, I obtain insights on how anycast improves its
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performance as new sites were added. (Note that an existing site may add replicas,
but that is not considered in the analysis.)
Figure 3.10 shows the performance of anycast versus the number of global sites
for different root servers. x-axis is the number of global sites. For each measured
root server, I evaluate the performance over each week from January 2017 to March
2019, and count the number of global sites in that week. Each measurement for
a root from a week is represented as a point in Figure 3.10. Therefore, there are
115 points for each root (identified by the root letter and unique color in the plot):
for example, over the measurement period, F-root increased from 5 sites to 110
sites. For each root, at each x-axis value (number of global sites), I show at most
4 performance values, including the 20th and 80th percentile among the values. I
sample the points for legibility, while illustrating the variance in performance.
I use two different performance measures as y-axis. Figure 3.10a shows the
average distance traveled by queries from RIPE Atlas probes to each root. This
metric is an absolute measure of performance, and it is expected to decrease as the
number of (global) sites increases. Figure 3.10b shows the fraction of queries that
traveled more than 500km farther than to their closest global site. The extra distance
traveled is a relative measure of performance, since the extra distance depends on
the number and distribution of available sites. Thus the result in Figure 3.10b
shows not only the performance of anycast, but more importantly, how efficiently
new global sites are utilized.
For some root servers (including C-, D-, J- and L-root), the number of global
sites is relatively stable over the year, and the vertical displacement of the letters
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represent the variance of performance. In the next section, I will investigate into
the effects of routing dynamic on performance of anycast. For other roots (includ-
ing E-, F-, and K-root) placed many (e.g., 105 for F-root) global sites during the
years. The results characterize the effect of such investment in anycast infrastruc-
ture. Unfortunately, even though F-root added 105 sites, its performance did not
improve significantly, both in absolute and relative terms. In general, performance,
somewhat counter-intuitively, is seemingly insular to the number of sites added.
3.7 Performance changes expose routing dynamics
The previous results show long-term persistent inefficiency in the performance of
anycast for most DNS root servers and three open resolvers. In addition, the wide
variation in measured performance under the same anycast deployment (e.g., the
same number of sites, with the same providers.) is observed in Figure 3.10, especially
for the root servers with a stable number of sites. Prior work [40–44] has shown that
routing changes, especially inter-domain routing changes, directly influence data
plane performance in unicast. In anycast, it is the Internet routing protocols that
determine which site serves a client. One should expect the dynamic nature of the
Internet routing could also cause fluctuation of end-to-end performance in anycast.
In this section, I demonstrate how to use longitudinal RIPE Atlas measurements
to (a) identify significant performance changes in anycast of DNS root servers; (2)




Cogent Communications COGENT 174
Deutsche Telekom AG DTAG 3320
Global Telecom & Technology GTT 3257, 4436
KPN KPN 286
Level 3 Communications LEVEL3 3356, 3549
Liberty Global LGI 6830
MCI Communications UUNET 701, 702, 703
NTT Communications NTT 2914
Orange S.A. OPENTRANSIT 5511
Qwest Communications QWEST 209
Sprint SPRINTLINK 1239
TATA Communications TATA 6453
Telecom Italia SEABONE 6762
Telefonica Network TELEFONICA 12956
Telia Carrier TELIANET 1299
XO Communications XO 2828
Zayo Group ZAYO 6461
Table 3.3: List of Tier-1 ISPs. The “Code” column lists the string by which the ISP
is identified in our results.
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3.7.1 Identify performance changes
I use the average distance traveled by queries from RIPE Atlas probes to anycast
address as an indicator for performance. During most of the time, the average dis-
tance between RIPE probes and their chosen sites was not consistent. Fluctuations
in average distance suggest some probes are routed to different anycast sites. And
impulsive shifts in this measure show substantial routing changes that affect a large
number of probes. By identifying changes in average distance, I can thus identify
when did routing changes happen. Figure 3.12a, 3.13a, 3.14a and 3.15a shows the
average distance that queries traveled in 2016 and 2017 from RIPE Atlas probes to
different DNS roots. At a high level, these results show that average query distances
remain relatively stable for months, but show sudden impulsive behavior that can
affect average query distances by thousands of kilometers.
3.7.2 Characterizing Tier-1s’ interaction with anycast
In this section, I describe how to character interactions between ISPs and anycast
deployments. Once I observed a performance shift in anycast deployment according
to the average distance measure, I would like to investigate the causes for it. I
focus on the events that cause impulsive shifts in performance, since such shifts are
usually results from a large number of probe start to send queries to new anycast
sites that are thousands of kilometers further than their the old ones. The paths
chosen by the ISPs that carried this traffic must have changed. Moreover, the route


























































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.11: Distribution of queries routed by Tier-1 ISPs for D-root on Oct.1st
2016. The left panels shows which sites the queries went to; the right panel shows
which sites are nearest to the RIPE Atlas probes.
probes affected and the significant distance between the new and old anycast sites.
To investigate this hypothesis, I focus on how queries that are routed through Tier-1
ISPs (identified from the data in [93] and listed in Table 3.3) reach global anycast
sites.
Note that I have two restrictions on the analysis. First, I only analyze queries
routed through Tier-1 ISPs. Tier-1 ISPs have a global presence and many hundreds
of peerings. Routing changes related to Tier-1 ISPs are likely affect a large number
of clients, and thus cause significant performance changes. Analyzing Tier-1s allows
us to understand how large ISPs interact with the DNS anycast. Second, I consider
only queries to global sites. This is because local sites are advertised within small
range, usually in one AS-hop, accounting for less than 10% of total D-root queries.
Also, queries to local sites are mostly adhered to the sites and rarely change routes
or traverse a Tier-1 to reach farther sites.
43
For each RIPE Atlas probe that originates in or traverses a Tier-1 ISP, I
record (1) the site the query is directed to, and (2) the closest global site the query
could have been directed to. I determine the ASes traversed by the queries from
the traceroutes measurements to the anycast sites, described in section 3.1.3. The
mapping from traceroutes to AS paths is based on methods described in section 4.3.
Since RIPE provides accurate probe locations and I can identify which site is chosen
at the time from CHAOS queries, I can compute where is the best sites for probes.
I use one example to explain how do I analyze the interactions between Tier-1
ISPs and anycast. Figure 3.11 contains two heatmaps. At left is a heatmap of
global site to which queries from RIPE Atlas probes to D-root were directed on
Oct.1st 2016, grouped by Tier-1 ISPs traversed. (If a query traversed more than
one Tier-1 ISPs, the path is classified by the first one.) Darker shades represent
higher query volume and the figure shows that most Tier-1 ISPs sent a large fraction
of their traffic to the mcva or abva. Although there are 20 global D-root sites (at
the time), the dark vertical line in this figure shows that most traffic is concentrated
predominantly on one site. Meanwhile, many sites go virtually unused.
The right side of Figure 3.11 shows how the queries should be distributed if
each query had been directed to its closest site. The distribution at right is a rough
approximation of the locations of RIPE Atlas probes hosted by networks that need a
Tier-1 to reach D-root. This figure represents what IP anycast could ideally achieve,
and it shows what anycast’s performance should to be: a far more even distribution
of load and more low-distance queries than what actually happens.
From the heatmap, I identify many examples of pathological path length in-
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flation: Deutsche Telekom, KPN, and Telianet direct most of their queries that
originate in Europe to the mcva site in Virginia, bypassing multiple European D-
root sites in Frankfurt, Amsterdam, and London. Similarly, queries routed through
Cogent, QWEST, Opentransit, UUNet and XO could benefit from being routed to
closer sites, but generally get routed to mcva.
3.7.3 A heuristic to expose routing dynamics
In this section, I use the same methodology, i.e., analyzing the distribution of queries
that traversed Tier-1 ISPs, to explain what exact routing changes caused significant
performance shifts in average query distance. I use case studies to better demon-
strate the heuristic. The cases are from several changes that affected C, D, E, and
F-root in 2016 and 2017. Events for D, E, and F-root show clear changes in the AS
paths: a set of Tier-1 ISPs changed how they reached the root address, typically
choosing a single poor site. The C-root event does not reveal a change in AS path,
but BGP advertisement traffic supports that a significant routing change was made.
3.7.3.1 C-root: LGI chooses a better peering
In November 2016, Figure 3.12a shows that the average distance for queries to C-
root decreased from 2300km to 2000km. (Because C-root is operated by Cogent, all
queries traverse a Tier-1, meaning that the lines of the figure are overlapped; we use
the difference to show the impact of routing changes beyond the Tier-1 ISPs.)

































































































































































































































(b) Query distribution by Tier-1 on Nov. 7 2016
Figure 3.12: Distribution of queries to C-root routed by Tier-1 ISPs before and after
routing change.
change and the day after (Figure 3.12c). As in Figures 3.11, the left shows where
queries went and the right shows which site is nearest. The key difference between































































































































































































Date in Nov. 2016
Number of BGP announcements
Number of announced prefixes
(d) Number of BGP announcements through LGI-Cogent peer-
ing, in early November 2016.
Figure 3.12: Distribution of queries to C-root routed by Tier-1 ISPs before and after
routing change.(Cont’d)
nearer to the clients that it supports.
Because C-root is operated by Cogent, and LGI peers directly with Cogent,
we sought to confirm that there was a significant routing change that occurred. In
IP address space, the paths clearly traverse a different set of IP addresses to cross
the peering. In BGP, the volume of BGP traffic associated with LGI to Cogent
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increased significantly at the same time, as shown in Figure 3.12d. This analysis
uses BGPStream [94] to see BGP updates collected from RouteViews, focusing on
prefixes advertised with the tuple LGI-Cogent (AS6830-AS174) in the AS Path. The
plot shows that the number of announcements and prefixes with LGI-Cogent tripled
around November 9, suggesting increased connectivity between the two.
3.7.3.2 D-root: Telia pulls DTAG to mcva
In June 2016, Figure 3.13a shows that the average distance for queries to D-root
increased by about 300km, or by about 1000km if considering only queries that
traversed Tier-1 ISPs. The key difference between Figure 3.13b and 3.13c is a shift
toward the mcva site for DTAG.
Figures 3.13d, 3.14d, and 3.15d, described in more detail below, share a com-
mon dataset and format. The underlying dataset comprises traceroutes taken from
RIPE Atlas probes to the root server’s anycast address. Concurrently, RIPE probes
query a special record from the root name server to determine which one was in
use at the time. We translate the IP addresses of hops along the path into their
originating AS to construct the traceroute-based AS path, then show only edges
after the ISPs involved in route changes.
In the figures, numbered nodes indicate Tier-1 ASNs that were part of a routing
change, or non-Tier-1 ASNs they used to reach a site. Named nodes at the bottom
indicate the sites that were reached by this set of ISPs. In this set of changes,




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(c) D-root on Jun. 25 2016
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(d) AS paths on Jun. 20 2016







(e) AS paths on Jun. 25 2016
Figure 3.13: Distribution of queries to D-root routed by Tier-1 ISPs before and after
the routing change. (a) Average query distance over time, (b) Query distribution
by first Tier-1 ISP before and (c) after, (d) AS paths evident in traceroutes before
and (e) after. In the AS graphs, edges represent appearance in traceroutes from at
least 4 sources, solid edges at least 15, and thicker edges at least 100.
indicates the number of traceroutes that included a link from one AS to another.
No edge appears if fewer than four traceroutes included such a link. Edges appear
dotted unless seen at least 15 times: on one hand, relatively few observations may
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be due to transient behavior, on the other, omitting these edges may hide diversity
that does not happen to be observed by RIPE probes. Plain edges are up to 100
observations, then lines are slightly thicker to 800, and in one case where roughly
1/10 of all RIPE probes used the connection from 3356 to 3549, a thickest line.
Figure 3.13d and 3.13e shows before and after Telia (1299) provided a direct
route to the mcva (northern Virginia) site, rather than use Cogent (174). DTAG
(3320) and AT&T (7018) switched routes to D-root from NTT (2914) to Telia (1299).
Telia appears to direct most all traffic to the Northern Virginia (mcva) site, and did
so even before the event when it first traversed Cogent (174) address space.
The precise scenario is unclear, but this event would reinforce that, to avoid
sending its own traffic far, a Tier-1 should not peer with an anycast operator in
just one location. In the event that a single peering is desired, to avoid collecting
traffic to be sent far, a Tier-1 should avoid exporting a route to others when having
a connection to only one site.
3.7.3.3 E-Root: 3356 starts advertising a route
In July 2016, Level3 appears to have begun treating an AS it acquired (3549) as
a sibling, re-advertising the route to E-root, instead of as a peer where it would
not re-advertise. This general change in relationship between 3356 and 3549 has
been documented by Dyn research [95]. The impact of this change appears in
Figure 3.14a, increasing the distance from RIPE Atlas probes to E-root by 800km,




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(c) E-root on July 26 2016
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3356 3549
ord miapao bur iad lhr fra qpg
2914
atl lga cdg syd
286 1200 3320 55116453 1299
(d) AS paths on July 24 2016
3356 3549




(e) AS paths on July 26 2016
Figure 3.14: Distribution of queries to E-root routed by Tier-1 ISPs before and after
the routing change. (a) Average query distance over time, (b) Query distribution by
first Tier-1 ISP before and (c) after, (d) AS paths evident in traceroutes before and
(e) after. In the AS graphs, edges represent appearance in traceroutes from at least
4 sources, solid edges at least 15, and thicker edges at least 100. Extra thickness
represents the over 800 traceroutes that traversed the 3356 to 3549 and 3549 to iad
site links.
Figure 3.14c shows that various providers switched from a site that was ap-
propriate for the client set (typically Frankfurt/fra) to northern Virginia (iad). Fig-
ure 3.14e shows the change to the AS path involved. Various providers that pre-
viously used NTT (2914) to reach E-root chose the new Level3 route, although
3356 directed those queries to a specific address within 3549, which then sent those
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queries to Northern Virginia (iad).
3.7.3.4 F-Root: Comcast advertises a route to Chicago
In March 2016, the average distance to F-root increased by almost 1,300km, as shown
in Figure 3.15a. This is the result of shifting substantial traffic to the Chicago site,
shown in Figures 3.14b and 3.14c.
Figures 3.15d and 3.15e show before and after Comcast (7922) appears to
have advertised a route to F-root, despite delivering queries it received only to the
Chicago (ORD) site. Notable is the prior diversity of sites (5 vs., in practice 1) and
paths for this set of ISPs. 7922 may be seen as a customer by other ISPs, which
could explain why so many Tier-1 ISPs chose the route to F-root through 7922.
In this plot, the middle tier (7922, 2914, 1280, etc.) are only shown for tracer-
oute paths that traverse the ISPs above. For example, the connection from UUNET
(701) to Palo Alto (PAO) appears over 100 times overall in the data, but appears
only rarely in a 12956-to-701-to-pao path. This change was corrected in November
2016, as can be seen in Figure 3.15a.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I show broad and longitudinal evaluation of distinct anycast deploy-
ments. I use passive traces collected from D-root sites over 3 years, as well as active
measurements performed from over global distributed 8,000 RIPE Atlas probes, to














































































































































































































































































































(c) F-root on March 20 2016
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3320 174 286 12956 7018
5511
(e) AS paths on March 20 2016
Figure 3.15: Distribution of queries to F-root routed by Tier-1 ISPs before and after
the routing change. (a) Average query distance over time, (b) Query distribution by
first Tier-1 ISP before and (c) after, (d) AS paths evident in traceroutes before and
(e) after. In the AS graphs, edges represent appearance in traceroutes from at least
4 sources, solid edges at least 15, and thicker edges at least 100. Extra thickness
represents the over 800 traceroutes that traversed the 7922 to ord site link.
tributed across them. The results show that about 30% of the queries traveled over
1000 km more than minimal; meanwhile, popular anycast sites attract over 10% of
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total traffic more than its “fair share”. By measuring nine DNS root servers with
distinct anycast deployments (i.e., different number of global or local sites, different
providers, etc.), I find that anycast is neither effective at directing queries to nearby
sites, nor distributing load in a balanced manner in general. Not only DNS root
servers, I also study anycast deployments in major DNS open resolvers, operated
by Google, OpenDNS and Cloudflare. These open resolvers appear to have better
performance than most DNS roots, however, there are still about 15% of the queries
to them travel more than 1,000 km extra distance. With the longitudinal mea-
surements of DNS roots over two years, I continuously track anycast performance
overtime. Counter-intuitively, having more anycast sites seems to have little correla-
tion to anycast performance. Further, I present a heuristic on identifying the causes
of performance shifts in anycast with case studies. These cases demonstrate how a
small change in routing decisions could cause significant change in anycast perfor-
mance, and lead us to further investigate the root causes of performance problems
in anycast.
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Chapter 4: Diagnosing Anycast Performance Problems
In the previous chapter, I show that anycast, for most DNS root servers and major
open resolvers, is ineffective at providing good geographic proximity for queries
or balancing traffic load across sites. Packets are directed to certain anycast server
based on BGP, the de facto interdomain routing protocol. However, BGP is a policy-
based protocol and lacks mechanisms to pick the routes with better performance.
Intuitively, BGP may create circuitous paths that are longer than the geographic
distance between endpoints would require, which is characterized as path inflation
in [92] Anycast allows BGP to select not only a circuitous path, but one that does not
even lead to a nearby site. In other words, anycast introduces extra path inflation
compared to unicast.
In this chapter, I quantify and compare the two sources of path inflation:
unicast path inflation that is well known and studied, and anycast path inflation
that is specific to routing in anycast. I develop novel measurement methodologies
that allow me evaluate the performance of alternate anycast sites, and gain insights
on how ISPs end up selecting the poor routes to distant anycast sites. Moreover, by
conducting experiments, I am able to identify the causes of anycast path inflation
and quantify how much each cause attributed to the overall inflation. I show that
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of anycast inflation compared to unicast inflation using a
real example. The probe in Japan has no direct route to the closest site ‘tojp’ and
was directed to ‘laca’, however ‘sgsg’ is the site that provides lower latency to the
probe.
the majority of anycast path inflation is caused by unknown, sometimes arbitrary
selection among seemingly “equal” routes by ISPs.
4.1 Anycast and unicast path inflation
In this section, I describe unicast and anycast path inflation. I refer to unicast path
inflation as the path inflation expected from typical unicast routing caused by BGP
policies and peering. Unicast routing is subject to path inflation in which the path
taken is longer than necessary. Spring et al. [92] decomposed path inflation into
topology and policy at the intra-domain, peering, and inter-domain levels, where
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each layer could add to the path distance either by incomplete topology (the lack
of a good path) or poor policy (choosing a poor path). Obviously, anycast routes
will also be subject to similar inflation. In addition to unicast path inflation, I refer
to anycast path inflation as the path inflation attributed specifically to routing of
anycast addresses: the path inflation over the closest anycast site due to selecting
routes to a distant site. These two sources of path inflation are illustrated in the
following example.
Figure 4.1 is derived from a real example in RIPE Atlas measurements. This
figure shows the case when a RIPE Atlas probe outside Tokyo, Japan, sends DNS
queries to D-root. Queries from this probe are directed to the D-root site laca in Los
Angeles, CA. The closest D-root site to this probe is the site tojp in Tokyo, Japan.
However, it turns out that the D-root site tojp in Tokyo does not provide the lowest
latency to the probe: using the measurement methodology described in 4.2, I find
that the there is no direct route (that does not traverse the United States) from the
probe to the site in Tokyo. Instead, the D-root site that provides the lowest latency
is in Singapore sgsg.
In this example, the extra distance from Tokyo to Singapore can be considered
inflation due to routing policy, thus attributed to unicast path inflation. However,
the latency difference between the probe–Singapore versus probe–Los Angeles is
due anycast path inflation. Anycast path inflation quantifies the extra performance
deficit incurred by routing of anycast addresses for not selecting shorter routes that
are available via unicast. In the rest of this section, I quantify anycast path inflation,
and identify the underlying causes.
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4.2 Unicast representatives of anycast sites
In order to quantify anycast path inflation experienced by a client, and compare it
with unicast path inflation, I plan to evaluate the performance of alternate anycast
sites that could have been chosen for the client. Note that packets sent to the any-
cast address will land on the site determined by BGP routing, and the performance
of alternate sites remains undiscovered. In this section, I present the novel measure-
ment methodology used to evaluate the performance of different anycast sites for a
client.
4.2.1 Selecting unicast representatives
A unicast representative for an anycast site is a unicast address that is geographically
close to the anycast site, and shares (substantially) the same network path when
reached from a source that is directed to that site via anycast. Preferably, a unicast
representative should be contained within the AS that advertises the anycast site.
For C-, K-, and L-root, they publish the unicast address used for management
of individual sites.1 I simply pick one address per site as the unicast representa-
tive address for that site. Although the management addresses have been used to
evaluating anycast performance [7], ISPs may treat the management addresses dif-
ferently from the anycast addresses. I evaluate if they serve as good representatives
for anycast sites.
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Figure 4.2: Unicast representatives show latency performance similar to the anycast
site they represent. The “Anycast” line shows the difference in latency between a
single sample of anycast and the median, as a baseline for comparison. The darker
line labeled “Unicast” shows the difference between a measurement of the unicast
representative and median of anycast samples.
Other root DNS servers (e.g., D-root [96]) locate their servers at Internet
Exchange Points (IXPs), the unicast representatives of their anycast sites are the
representatives at corresponding IXPs. Packet Clearing House (PCH) operates route
collectors at more than 150 IXPs, and releases the BGP routing tables collected from
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C-Root % D-Root % K-Root %
Sites Agree Sites Agree Sites Agree
bts 90.7% abva 96.2% at-vie 69.0%
fra 91.8% amnl 96.1% bg-sof 86.2%
iad 92.9% chil 97.3% ch-gva 83.3%
jfk 91.7% ffde 92.4% cl-scl 52.3%
lax 91.8% hkcn 80.0% de-ham 96.4%
mad 85.9% louk 95.5% es-bcn 81.8%
ord 95.7% paca 99.4% fr-par 65.5%
par 81.4% tojp 95.8% rs-beg 73.3%
qro 100.0% viat 96.6% us-ric 70.8%
sin 96.5% zuch 84.9% za-jnb 70.0%
Table 4.1: AS path agreement between unicast representatives and sites; ten sites
per letter are shown.
these route collectors [97]. These routing tables provide us with other (unicast)
prefixes that directly connected at the IXP. I choose an address from the smallest
unicast prefix at an IXP as the unicast representative of the collocated anycast site.2
Preferably, the prefix should be from the AS that advertises the anycast site, e.g.,
PCH (AS42) for D-root.
With this heuristic method, I obtain unicast representatives for D-root global
2E-root also uses PCH and does not publish management addresses, but recently also started
distributing via Cloudflare, making this technique of IXP-based representatives incomplete for E.
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sites. Note that two global sites are missing mcva and cpmd since they are not
collocated with IXPs. Fortunately, these two sites are disproportionately chosen by
many queries originated from nearby or distant regions, so routes to mcva/cpmd are
already shown in most cases.
4.2.2 Goodness of unicast representatives
Using the method just described, I select unicast representatives for C-, D-, K- and
L-root. Before measuring alternate anycast sites using the unicast representatives,
I evaluate how well they represent their corresponding anycast sites. From each
vantage point, I measure the latency as well as the traceroute path to the anycast site
through anycast address, and to the corresponding unicast representative through
its unicast address. I compare the measured latencies and check if the paths overlap.
Recall that RIPE Atlas probes allow people to send DNS CHAOS queries and
traceroutes, to both anycast and unicast representative addresses. Each probe (van-
tage point) provide me measurements that used to evaluate one single site (and the
corresponding unicast representative) per root. From DNS CHAOS query measure-
ments, I obtain which probe uses which anycast site. (I only select probes that have
stable affinity to their sites during measurements) I assign probes to measure the
unicast representative corresponding to the site it used, so a different number of
probes may be used to measure different sites. Due to measurements budget, I use
about 2,000 probes to measure their anycast sites and unicast representatives for
each root. Probes are assigned across different sites, limiting to at most 200 probes
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per site for C- and D-root, 30 probes per site for the larger K and L. Some sites will
be assigned with fewer probes if too few probes are directed to that site through
anycast. From each probe, I send traceroutes to both the anycast address and to
the unicast representative of the site the probe used. I obtain both latencies and IP-
level paths from the probe to the anycast address and to the unicast representative.
Note that this is a one-time measurement.
Figure 4.2 characterizes the difference between latency to the unicast repre-
sentatives and the latency to corresponding anycast sites of C-, D-, K- and L-root.
To account for the natural variance in latency, I also obtain the median latency
from the probe to anycast address (using RIPE Atlas’ built-in ping measurements)
during the one-hour window around the time I conduct measurements. I refer this
median latency as median anycast latency from probe to anycast site. Then, I com-
pute the differences of both one-time measured latencies (to anycast address and
to unicast representative) to the median anycast latency. I aggregate latency dif-
ferences from all selected probes and plot them as CDFs as shown in Figure 4.2.
In the plots, x-axis is the latency difference relative to the median anycast latency;
y-axis shows cumulative fraction of probes. ‘Anycast’ line shows the difference be-
tween individual anycast measurement and the median, which serves as a baseline;
‘Unicast’ line plots the difference between individual measurement to the unicast
representative and the median anycast latency is a measure of representativeness:
the closer ‘Unicast’ line is to the baseline, the better representativeness the unicast
addresses have. For the measured roots, the comparison in Figure 4.2 shows that
the unicast representatives are not routed in a way that systematically degrades (or
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improves) their performance.
In addition to similarity in latency, the traceroute measurements allow me
to evaluate the similarity in AS level paths to anycast sites versus unicast repre-
sentatives. I use the method described below in 4.3 to infer AS level paths from
traceroutes. Table 4.1 shows a sample of sites from different roots and the fraction
of probes that have matching AS paths to the anycast sites and to corresponding
unicast representative. The AS paths show a close match overall, with around 90%
for C, 90% for D, 75% for K, and 85% for L-root of the probes have matching AS
paths. The AS path matches for C- and D-root were better than for K- and L-root.
One difference between the two is that C- and D-root have single hosting ASes (Co-
gent and PCH) from which unicast representatives are drawn, while K- and L-root
have different hosting ASes at different sites. However, I do not expect complete
agreement, since unicast and anycast addresses are in different prefixes that may be
routed differently.
4.3 AS path inference
Section 4.2 presents a methodology to measure the performance of different anycast
sites. In this section, I describe an AS-level path inference method that provides
insights on how BGP routing ends up choosing poor routes to the anycast prefix.
For each client, I compare its path to the chosen anycast site with the path to a
unicast representative of a closer site, thus to locate the “decision point” where the
two paths diverge. It is at this “decision point” that route selection failed: although
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a good path exists to the closer site (i.e., the path to the unicast representative), a
path to a different site was preferred. By identifying the “decision point” AS and
its next-hop ASes in the routes to different sites, I can infer which of the next-hops
was selected based on routing policies.
In order to identify the “decision point” AS, I need to infer AS-level paths
from traceroutes collected at RIPE Atlas probes. CAIDA’s prefix-to-AS mapping
datasets [93] provide basic mapping from IP-level traceroutes to AS-level paths. But
this simple mapping method is inaccurate and incomplete because of missing hops,
multiple-origin prefixes, and the IXP prefixes in traceroutes. I then describe how I
infer AS-level path from traceroute path.
Mao et al. [98] proposed a heuristic method to improve IP-to-AS mapping.
They collected traceroute and BGP tables from the same set of vantage points.
Then, they proposed algorithms to identify various factors that may cause missing
and extra AS hops observed in traceroute by comparing the traceroutes and BGP
AS paths. Without BGP feeds from RIPE Atlas probes used for traceroute measure-
ments, their algorithms do not apply directly. However I can apply their methods
to refine AS path inference:
• If an unresponsive/unresolved IP hop from traceroutes is between of two hops
that map to the same AS, I assume the unmapped hop belongs to the same
AS as the surrounding AS hops.
• If an unresolved IP hop is in between hops that map to different ASes, use
the domain name of the unresolved IP hop, if available, to associate it with a
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neighboring AS.
• Identify prefixes that belong to IXPs. IP addresses assigned to IXPs may
appear in traceroutes and thus introduce an extra AS hop relative to the
corresponding BGP AS paths. I identify such hops and remove them from
inferred AS path. Nomikos and Dimitropoulos provide a tool [99] to collect
IP prefixes assigned to IXPs. They collect data from PeeringDB [100] and
PCH [101], including prefixes for over 1000 IXPs. Using this dataset should
yield better detection accuracy than the algorithm for IXP detection used
in [98].
• Detect multiple origin ASes (MOAS). Once found a MOAS hop, I map it to
a set of ASes. For the rest of the paper, I include these traceroutes in our
comparison with other traceroutes. I consider these traceroute hops “match”
with the corresponding hop in other traceroutes if the AS in the other path
matches any one of the ASes associated with the MOAS hops.
According to the evaluation in [98], with basic IP-to-AS mapping using BGP
tables, only about 72% of traceroutes matched the corresponding BGP AS paths.
By applying the first three steps above to resolve the unmapped IP hops and IXP
addresses, the matching rate increased above 80%. Based on this, I expect that
applying these techniques will infer the AS path with at least 80% accuracy. Note
that this overall matching rate serves as a lower bound on the matching accuracy
of suffixes of the paths (after the “decision point”).
I do not consider traceroutes that cannot be completely resolved: if an un-
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responsive or unresolved IP hop lies between two different ASes, I abandon this
traceroute and the comparison to other paths from the same probe. This affects at
least one traceroute from 20% of the probes for C and D root and from nearly half
of the probes measuring K, described in more detail below in Section 4.4.
4.4 Measurement methodology
In this section, I describe the experiments conducted to help quantify anycast path
inflation. Suppose source s sends a query to anycast address a; this query reaches
site Ss→a. With methods described in §4.2 and §4.3, I can evaluate the performance
of an alternate site that could have been chosen for the query.
In this experiment, I collect performance measures from each RIPE Atlas probe
s to three particular anycast sites: its selected anycast site Ss→a; its geographically
closest site Gs→a; and the site that provides s lowest latency Ls→a. Ss→a is already
measured by RIPE Atlas probes with the “built-in” traceroutes. Gs→a is easy to
measure by sending traceroute to the unicast representative of the nearest site to
the RIPE Atlas probe. Ideally, Ls→a should be obtained from exhaustively probing
each anycast site from the probe s. However, RIPE Atlas platform is a shared re-
source that enforces rate limiting. Due to limited measurement budgets on RIPE
Atlas platform, it is not feasible to conduct exhaustive probing. Instead, I measure
a couple more candidate anycast sites, and set Ls→a as the one that provides lowest
latency among measured sites. Note that it only causes (potentially) underestima-
tion of anycast path inflation by sampling candidates for Ls→a As shown in later
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results, anycast path inflation is already high without exhaustively maximizing the
inflation.
Specifically, I estimate the lowest latency from s to a as follows. If the mea-
sured latency to the geographically closest site Gs→a, is less than that predicted by
distance (using the Htrae constant [90], 0.0269 ms/mile) to the second closest site
G′s→a, then assume Ls→a = Gs→a. That is, choose the geographically closest site
as the lowest-latency site if the second closest (so are other sites) is unlikely to be
better. If Ss→a is already the second closest replica G
′
s→a, assume Ls→a is either
Ss→a or Gs→a, whichever is less. Otherwise, I will measure the latency to G
′
s→a and
set Ls→a to the least-latency one of measured sites Ss→a, Gs→a, and G
′
s→a. In some
cases, I may choose to measure the third-closest, or a popular site that is within a
distance that could yield lower latency.
I focus on the probes whose selected anycast site Ss→a is farther than 500 km
beyond the geographically closest site Gs→a. For these probes, it is likely that their
performance can be improved. For C-root, I collected traceroutes from 1862 such
probes, and 1541 of them have all complete traceroutes according to §4.3; for D-root,
I collected traceroutes from 3570 probes and 2785 provided complete traceroutes; for
K-root, I collected traceroutes from 2886 probes and 1398 of them were complete.
With these measurements, I quantify anycast path inflation and compare it with
























































































































































Figure 4.3: Comparison between anycast path inflation and unicast path inflation.
4.5 Quantify anycast path inflation
With the traceroutes measurements to Ss→a, Gs→a and Ls→a for each probe s, I ana-
lyze how much of the performance deficit in anycast is due to unicast path inflation,
and how much is due to anycast path inflation caused by bad route selection.
Anycast path inflation is computed as the difference between latencies to Ss→a
and Ls→a. Typical, unicast path inflation from BGP is computed as the difference
between the latency to Ls→a and the predicted latency with Htrae constant [90], by
distance, to Gs→a.
Figure 4.3 shows unicast and anycast path inflation measured from 1541 probes
for C-, 2785 for D-, and 1398 for K-root. The results show that for C-root, anycast
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path inflation is much smaller than unicast path inflation. As described in §3.4,
once the queries to C-root entered Cogent, anycast provider of C-root, it is unlikely
that queries are directed to distant sites based on intra-domain routing. For D- and
K-root, anycast path inflation is larger and affecting more probes than unicast path
inflation. That is, for D- and K-root, BGP routing often fails to choose the better
route for a probe, and incurs larger latency inflation by send queries to a distant
site. Consider that D- and K-root have more anycast sites, it seems suggest that
extra choices provided by more sites can harm performance, since ISPs may (and
do) choose the worse route out of many available, thereby increasing the latency to
the anycast.
I further breakdown the anycast path inflation by it specific causes. As de-
scribed in §4.1, anycast path inflation is incurred by selecting a worse route to a
distant anycast site among the available ones. With the traceroutes from each probe
to multiple anycast sites, I infer the AS paths selected by BGP and the “decision
point” where the route selection failed using the method in §4.3. Route selection
mechanism at the “decision point” is usually based on two policies in the Gao-
Rexford model [25,26] and a common assumption that shorter routes are preferred:
• “Valley-Free”: After a provider-to-customer edge or a peer-to-peer edge in the
AS path, the route can not traverse customer-to-provider edges or another
peer-to-peer edges.
• “Prefer-Customer”: The ISP prefers routes through its customer ASes over
the peer ASes, over its provider ASes.
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Prefer Shortest Unknown
Roots Total Good Customer AS-Path Tie-breaking
C-root 1541 91.0% 0.0% 0.2% 8.8%
D-root 2785 26.5% 6.8% 25.5% 41.1%
K-root 1398 8.6% 8.7% 17.3% 65.4%
Table 4.2: Why probes do not choose closest sites.
• “Shorter AS-Path”: The ISP prefers routes with shorter AS path length.
Note that the available paths to different anycast sites are policy-complaint
paths, i.e., all these paths are “Valley-Free”. For each probe, I compare the available
paths to different sites at the “decision point”, and identify which policy likely
caused BGP to make the decision: “Prefer-Customer”, “Shorter AS-Path” or some
“Unknown” tie-breaking rule if the first two policies result in a tie. First I obtain AS
relations between “decision point” AS and its next-hop ASes in different routes with
AS-relation datasets [93], and order AS relations based on “Prefer-Customer” policy.
If the selected route is preferred, then I claim the route is selected due to “Prefer-
Customer”. If the selected route is not preferred based on “Prefer-Customer”, I
compare the AS path lengths of different routes starting from “decision point”.
If the selected route is shorter, it is probably selected due to “Shorter AS path”
policy. Otherwise, I conclude that the route is selected based on some “Unknown”
tie-breaking rules.






























































































































































Figure 4.4: Anycast path inflation and inflation if BGP can: (1) ‘tie-break’ correctly;
(2) also ignore AS-Path length.
It lists the number of measured probes to C-, D- and K-root, the number that were
routed to the lowest-latency sites, and the numbers that were not due to various
reasons. For all three roots, the results suggest that the queries were not directed to
the lowest-latency anycast site mostly because of some “Unknown” tie-break rules.
In other words, many of the queries could have been routed to lower-latency sites
if the ISPs applied better tie-break rules. I will next quantify the benefits of better
tie-break rules and route selections.
Figure 4.4 shows how much of the anycast path inflation can be recovered
if “decision points” select routes better. The figure shows results from the same
measurements as in Figure 4.3 for C-, D- and K-root: the “Anycast inflation” (red)
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lines correspond to the anycast path inflation as shown in Figure 4.3. The “Perfect
tie-break” (green) lines illustrate the anycast path inflation that remains if “decision
points” always select lowest-latency routes among those who have the shortest AS-
path length. The “Ignore AS-path” (purple) lines show anycast path inflation when
the “decision points” always select the best route regardless of AS-path length, but
still follow “Prefer-Customer” policy.
Table 4.2 and Figure 4.4 are extremely encouraging results: they show that
much of the performance deficit can be recovered if “decision points” ISPs tie-break
more intelligently. BGP routers make selections mainly based on policies, and do
not have sufficient information to make good selections. There exists measurement-
based optimization services that help identify lowest-latency route, and such services
are used for multi-homed ASes to choose providers (e.g.,Internap Managed Internet
Route Optimizer [102]). However, the deployment of such services needs to be
widespread enough in order to systematically improve the performance of anycast,
which requires long time and large resources to achieve. In the next section, I will
discuss what other forms of fixes can be applied on BGP to improve anycast.
4.6 Conclusion
As anycast deployed in more critical infrastructure, understanding the problems in
its performance and the root causes becomes an important task to maintain and
improve efficiency of anycast. However, prior work provides few explanations on the
root causes for anycast’s inefficient performance. Researchers expect BGP routing
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to be at fault for performance deficit, but rarely quantitatively show how much of
the deficit BGP causes.
In this chapter, I describe that how does anycast, in addition to unicast, in-
troduce another layer of path inflation. Although prior work has shown that BGP
may create circuitous paths and thus path inflation [92], I develop a novel mea-
surement method to quantify how much path inflation is in anycast. By evaluating
performance of alternate anycast sites, I compare the path inflation in anycast to
that in unicast, and show that anycast inflation is usually much larger than unicast
inflation. Further, I apply the standard BGP model [25, 26] to analyze how ISPs
end up selecting the route to distant anycast sites. My analysis shows that most of
the anycast inflation is due to ISPs’ unknown or random tie-breaking among routes
that are “equivalent” based on the BGP model. Finally, I show it is promising to fix
anycast: much of the performance deficit in anycast can be recovered if ISPs could
have information to tie-break more intelligently. In the next chapter, I investigate
the causes, if any, that make ISPs tie-break poorly.
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Chapter 5: Inferring Provider Preferences via Route Manipulation
In the previous chapter, I conclude that the large latency inflation observed in many
anycast deployments is mainly caused by performance-unawareness of BGP rout-
ing. Gao and Rexford [25,26] proposed the dominant model of BGP routing. They
model interdomain routing with two rules: “Valley-free” and “Prefer-Customer”,
as described in section 4.5. When multiple routes satisfy the two rules, researchers
usually assume that the routes with shortest AS-path length are selected, i.e., the
“Shorter AS-path” policy. But is this assumption always true? Even if the shortest
paths are preferred by ISPs, since the paths are typically short and may be shorter
among busy paths due to the prevalent usage of CDNs [103,104], one should expect
tied routes exist, especially in anycast scenarios [68]. Prior work on modeling Inter-
net routing has used different ways to break ties: by AS number [83], by customer
cone size [105] or at random [64,74].
To better understand the problems I discovered in previous chapters, i.e.,
ISPs fail to choose routes to the nearby anycast sites among the equivalent ones,
I develop methods that use large-scale data plane measurements and control plane
experiments to identify how ISPs choose providers to forward their traffic when
presented with valid routes from multiple providers. The insight is that by selectively
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making certain paths look better or worse to a particular ISP, I can infer the ISP’s
preferences relative to alternative paths. I conduct experiments on the PEERING
testbed [27,106] using several route manipulation techniques:
Route poisoning (§5.2) My first experiment exposes alternate paths to PEERING
prefix from different ASes, and reveals relative preferences among the paths. I use
PEERING to temporarily poison BGP announcements and cause ASes to withdraw
the poisoned routes, and then un-poison the routes. I run traceroutes from the
vantage points towards the PEERING prefix to observe the paths before and af-
ter I poison/un-poison the routes. This experiment allows us to discover relative
preference among paths and thus reverse engineer route selection process.
Community tags (§5.3) In the second experiment, I use PEERING to embed in
BGP announcements a set of community tags customized for traffic engineering in
different ASes. The community tags, if propagated to the target ASes, will cause
the ASes to not export the routes, thus effectively “poisoned” routes. Same as in
the first experiment, I then obtain alternate paths and reveal relative preferences.
Selective prepending (§5.4) In my third experiment, I selectively un-prepend and
prepend AS paths from PEERING, and then send traceroutes from vantage points
to the prefix. I discover the ASes that prefer shorter AS-length routes with mea-
surements from this experiment.
For all of the experiments, I use the RIPE Atlas platform [87,88], which consists
a set of approximately 9,000 probes located in about 180 countries and over 3,500
ASes, as the vantage points to collect traceroutes.
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Once I discover relative preferences among routes, I focus on ones that are tied
in Gao-Rexford model, and the preferred routes are not due to “Shortest AS path”
policy. I thus reveal that customer ISPs’ relative preferences among their providers.
Such preference rankings among Tier-1s are configured through ‘Local Pref’ in BGP,
and are considered before the “Shortest AS path” policy in route selection. By
aggregating the discovered preference ranking among Tier-1s, I find common and
consistent partial order of Tier-1 ISPs for their customers: if one customer ISP
prefers Tier-1 x over Tier-1 y, many other networks do, too. I further reveal the
customer ISPs who select the shorter routes from multiple Tier-1s. However, only
about 50% of the customers choose to use shorter routes when available, much of
other customers remain on the longer paths. These results suggest the “Shortest
AS path” policy might be applied less often than people expected, thus interdomain
traffic engineering that employs selective AS path prepending to redirect traffic may
not be as effective [11]. In the end, I quantify the effect of the discovered preference
to anycast performance.
5.1 Motivation and background
5.1.1 Funneling effect of transit providers
Observations in Chapter 3 on query distributions across Tier-1 ISPs motivate us to
consider further investigations in how customer ISPs choose among routes received
from multiple Tier-1s. For example, even though the closer to European anycast
sites exist, many clients choose to send their packets particularly through Deutsche
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Telekom and then directed to the D-root site in Virginia. It seems that for those
clients, Deutsche Telekom is the preferred Tier-1 to send packets through. Are there
local policies installed within customers of Deutsche Telekom that encourage them
to choose the routes through it, even those routes might perform poorly? In anycast,
if customer ISPs tend to prefer one provider who only have routes to poor anycast
sites, it may significantly harm anycast performance. As shown in Figure 3.11, a
Tier-1 provider (e.g.,DTAG, KPN, etc.) might always “funnel” queries through it
to a certain D-root site mcva. And it happens not only for D-root.
I use following measurements to demonstrate such “funneling” behavior is
common for other DNS roots in a research/educational transit provider, Inter-
net2 [107]. Internet2, along with some other research and educational networks
(e.g., GEANT(AS20965,AS21320) [108]), provide cheap or even free transit for uni-
versity/research networks [109, 110]. As ISPs tend to send their traffic through a
cheaper neighbor [59, 60], it is likely that ISPs prefer to use routes through Inter-
net2. As a preferred transit provider, how Internet2 route queries to anycast prefixes
would have large impact on its customers. I collected RIPE Atlas traceroutes to
nine DNS roots that went through Internet2 , and tracked where the queries are
routed to. I used the traceroutes from two separate days, May 1st 2016 and May
1st 2018, to exclude transient observations. As shown in Table 5.1, Internet2 fun-
neled the queries through it to one particular anycast site for most of the roots: On
May 1st 2018, traceroutes to 6 out of 7 DNS roots through Internet2 are all directed
to one anycast site of each root; on May 1st 2016, traceroutes to 4 out of 5 roots are
funneled to one site of each root. This result suggests that Internet2 funnels their
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queries to particular anycast site regardless the sources. Anycast deployments could
suffer from the funneling effect caused by transit providers. The more popular these
providers are, the more performance deficits in anycast are introduced.
To understand if ISPs have preference towards particular transit providers
(e.g., DTAG in Figure 3.11), I work on revealing relative preferences ranking among
Tier-1 ISPs for customer ISPs. In the rest of the chapter, I describe how to use
route manipulation techniques as measurement methods to answer the following
questions: do ISPs have preferences ranking among their providers? Are the pref-
erences ranking among Tier-1s common and consistent across customers? With the
relative preferences in place, how often is “Shortest AS path” policy applied in route
selection? how do such preferences affect performance in anycast?
5.1.2 The PEERING testbed
My experiments are made possible by the PEERING testbed [27, 106]. PEERING
is an experimental platform that allow researchers to interact with the Internet’s
control plane. It owns a public IP address space and an ASN that researchers can
announce to the Internet. PEERING now has 10 servers distributed in Europe,
North America and South America, and its prefixes can be announced from all the
servers simultaneously. That is, the testbed itself can be used to setup an anycast
deployment. These servers peer with hundreds of networks that provide rich connec-
tivity to the clients and vantage points. PEERING provides functionality such as
announcing poisoned route (i.e., inserting poisoned AS in the announcements), em-
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May 1st 2018 May 1st 2016
Roots Popular # Probes to # Probes Popular # Probes to # Probes
site popular site traversed I2 site popular site traversed I2
A-root lax 5 5 none 0 0
C-root none 0 0 none 0 0
D-root nyny 1 1 mcva 78 78
E-root nuq 49 49 arc.nasa 38 38
F-root none 0 0 none 0 0
I-root chi 50 51 chi 45 45
J-root yvr 22 23 none 0 0
K-root ch-gva 53 53 ch-gva 33 49
L-root lwc 39 39 syd 25 25
Table 5.1: Which site did Internet2 route the queries to?
bedding community tags in the announcements, and announcing prepended routes
at selective locations.
I use this testbed to announce prefixes to the Internet from all 10 locations in
the experiments in an ethical manner. While conducting I strictly follow the PEER-
ING Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) [111]: I only announce prefixes that belong to
PEERING and are allocated to us (no other users were using our prefix). Moreover,
I always announce prefixes with the correct origin ASN (i.e., the one it owns) to make
sure no hijacking took place in the experiments. I make BGP announcements from
the testbed at the rate of at most once per 20 minutes to allow route to converge
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and avoid route flap dampening. In short, I use PEERING as instructed; I make
sure my experiments do not overload BGP routers in the Internet with excessive
BGP announcements; and I do not adversely affect any other networks’ routes.
5.2 Route poisoning experiment
My first experiment uses route poisoning to selectively make alternate routes prefer-
able. By strategically announcing poisoning routes, this experiment reveals many
ASes’ relative preferences among routes and amongst their providers amongst their
providers. The experiment proceeds in three phases:
• Default I initialize the experiment by advertising a /24 prefix S (allocated to
us by PEERING) from 10 PEERING locations. S does not host any services,
and thus, advertising, withdrawing, or poisoning route to P does not affect
any material traffic on the Internet. After advertising the prefix, I collect
traceroutes from RIPE Atlas probes to an address in S. These traceroutes,
mapped to AS paths (using AS path inference as described in 4.3 to map the
traceroutes to AS paths), gives me the default paths chosen by different ASes.
• Poison I take the top-50 ASes that are traversed the most in the default
traceroute set, and advertise “poisoned” paths, such that these ASes cannot
forward traffic to P. Specifically, one by one, for each AS a in the top 50, I
advertise routes in which we insert a in the route advertised by PEERING;
this eventually triggers loop prevention in BGP and causes a to dislodge the
default route, as a must not forward the “poisoned” route since it’s AS number
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is already in the route received. After each poisoned advertisement is sent,
I again collect traceroutes (and map them to ASes) to discover alternate AS
paths (if any) to P.
• Recovery Finally, I restore the poisoned routes by re-announcing the original
BGP announcements (without poisoning). Once again, I conduct traceroutes
from the same set of RIPE Atlas probes and map them to AS paths. This
final set of AS paths lets us determine if the alternate paths remain preferable
after the original (default) paths becomes available again.
Similar route poisoning experiments have been used as measurement methods
to discover hidden network topology [80], to evaluate the prevalence of default rout-
ing [81] and to identify alternate back-up paths in the Internet [79]. Researchers
have also proposed to use BGP poisoning as a mechanism to reroute traffic and
avoid congestion links under DDoS attacks [82–84]. I use the route poisoning’s abil-
ity to reveal local preferences of ASes, and augment it with other route manipulation
mechanisms, including remote traffic engineering with community tags and selective
AS-path (un)prepending.
While running the route poison experiments to discover alternate routes, I
collect the ICMP packets from RIPE Atlas probes on a PEERING client. The
client runs a BIRD routing daemon and connects to each PEERING server via an
OpenVPN tunnel created between a local TAP interface and the server. PEERING
prefix is announced from the client via BIRD routing daemon to the servers, then
to the Internet. Traceroutes towards the prefix will be routed to the PEERING
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servers, and then to the client. With this deployment, I can collect the packets that
are sent to the prefix locally on the client I run. By collecting traceroute packets on
the host (using tcpdump), I identify which server receives each packet by checking
which TAP interface received the packet. The collected packets allow me to identify
which servers the default and alternate paths are lead to, and thus evaluate the
anycast performance of the default and alternate paths.
5.2.1 Inferring provider preference
For each poisoned AS and for each RIPE Atlas probe used, I obtain a path triplet:
a default path, an alternate path and a recovery path. In some cases, the alternate
path is null, since the probe only had one path to P or all other paths to P become
unavailable after poisoning. Using these, I reveal the preferences among the triplet of
paths, and infer whether ISPs prefer routes from one provider over others, regardless
of AS path length. Relative preference between paths is established if 1. the recovery
path is the same as the default path, and 2. the alternate path has shorter AS path
lengths. Indeed, it is possible that local policy at an AS could still explicitly prefer
paths from a provider when one or both of the previous criteria is violated; this
experiment is unable to positively assert such preferences. From the preferences
between default and alternate paths, I infer the “decision point” ISP’s preference
among its providers. I focus on Tier-2 ISPs as they reveal preferences among Tier-1
providers.
I conducted the three phase route poisoning experiment monthly over five
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# # Src. # Path Not Reverting Reverting to Default
Date probes ASes Triplets to Default Default not Shorter
Dec. ’18 3178 3063 982 28 964 349
Jan. ’19 3202 3073 1059 17 1042 381
Feb. ’19 8325 3080 2203 48 2155 648
Mar. ’19 8489 3099 1995 31 1964 553
Apr. ’19 8459 3107 2154 64 2090 615
Table 5.2: Route poisoning deployments
No Not Reverting Not Longer Longer
Date Alternate to Default Alternate Alternate
Dec. ’18 169 15 76 41
Jan. ’19 139 9 80 40
Feb. ’19 179 25 64 49
Mar. ’19 205 8 44 49
Apr. ’19 204 28 70 20
All 232 52 136 74
Table 5.3: Breakdown of Tier-2 ISPs’ policies on selecting providers, as recorded by
our monthly experiments.
months, once each in December 2018 through April 2019. I collect the path triplets
and conduct analysis described in the last paragraph. Table 5.2 shows the details
of the deployments as they changed over time: the “# Probes” and “# Src ASes”
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columns list the number of RIPE Atlas probes used in my experiments (and their
source ASes). The “# Path Triplets” column counts the number of complete (De-
fault, Alternate, Recovery) path triplets these experiments generated. I exclude
paths triplets that cannot be fully resolved to AS paths, and triplets whose default
paths do not traverse the poisoned AS or alternate path still traverse the poisoned
AS (likely due to default routing [81]). The “Reverting to Default” column counts
the number of configurations in which the probes reverted back to the default path
when it became available again. This result shows that for over 90% of the path
triplets, the default paths are preferred over the alternate. The “Not Reverting
to Default” columns counts the configurations in which the default path was not
reverted back to. The latter counts cases in which the AS kept the alternate path
or chose an entirely new recovery path. Finally, the “Default not Shorter” column
counts the cases in which the default AS path was not shorter than the alternate
paths. There are about 30% of the complete triplets reveal the preferences towards
default paths even the alternate have shorter or equal AS path lengths.
Further analysis of the “Reverting to Default” routes enable us to understand
whether ASes prefer certain providers, regardless of the advertised AS path lengths.
I focus on decisions at multi-homed Tier-2 ISPs who use multiple Tier-1 as transit
providers. Tier-1 providers have global presence and many hundreds of peerings
and customers. Thus a large number of routes, especially routes connecting two
distant hosts, traverse Tier-1s. Preference among Tier-1s, when exists, will likely
be revealed by customers ASes in my experiments. In Gao-Rexford model, Tier-
1 ISPs are considered equivalent since most other ISPs treat them as providers.
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However, they might have vastly different performance, as shown in Section 3.7. The
preference between Tier-1s provides important insights on modeling routes selection
process and understanding the impact on routing performance.
I catalog whether the multi-homed Tier-2s reverted to the default path even
if the alternate AS path was shorter. Table 5.3 breaks down the behavior of Tier-
2 ASes, each of which have more than one Tier-1 provider. The “No Alternate”
column counts Tier-2 ASes that have only one path to P, regardless of being multi-
homed according to CAIDA’s AS topology data [93]. These ASes lose their route
to P during the “Poison” phase of the experiment. The “Not Reverting to Default”
column counts the Tier-2 ASes that do not revert to their default path after it
becomes available again. The “Longer Alternate” counts Tier-2s that find alternate
paths, but these paths are longer than the default. For the ASes in these two
columns, I cannot infer Tier-1 preference from this experiment.
The “Alternate not Longer” column counts Tier-2 ASes that revert back to the
default path, even if the alternate path was the same length or longer. This column
shows that these Tier-2 ASes prefer paths through the default Tier-1 provider over
comparable or shorter paths from another. In the following subsection, I focus

















Figure 5.1: Preferences between Tier-1 ISPs revealed by the experiment in December
2018. In the graphs, nodes represent ISPs and edges represent observed preferences
between the ISPs. Edge direction shows preference order (from high to low), edge
width indicates number of ISPs that have the preference, and dotted edges represent
preference had in only one ISP.
5.2.2 Preference ranking among Tier-1 ISPs
The “Alt. not longer” column in Table 5.3 counts Tier-2 ASes that prefer paths
though Tier-1 providers, regardless of AS path length. Such preference is not a result
of the “Prefer Customer” policy since the Tier-2 ASes in this case are customers of
both the upstream Tier-1s. Figure 5.1, 5.1 and 5.3 depict these preferences using a
graph: each node is a Tier-1 ISP, and there is an directed edge between two nodes
if the source was preferred even though AS path length over the destination in any
of the route poisoning experiments. For example, an edge from AS3356 to AS3320































(b) From experiment in February 2019.
Figure 5.2: Preference between Tier-1 ISPs revealed by the experiments in January
and February 2019.
thickness of the edge indicates (in log scale) the number of distinct Tier-2 ASes
that preferred the source node over the sink. The dotted edges represent preference































(b) From experiment in April 2019.

















Figure 5.4: Preference between Tier-1 ISPs aggregated over all experiments. Pref-
erence revealed through only one ISP is not shown.
aggregated across all experiments. This figure excludes dotted lines, i.e., the cases
where only one Tier-2 AS had a preference. If the preference is observed from only
one ISP across all experiments, it is likely a local decision specific to that ISP.
The graph shows an unexpected property: from the route poisoning exper-
iments, preferences over Tier-1 ASes form a near perfect partial order, and this
ordering is consistent over the five months of data. Only one pair of nodes (AS3356
and AS174) have edges in both directions, indicating that some Tier-2 ASes pre-
ferred one over the other, and vice versa. In all other cases, either there was no
data, or the preferences are consistent across all the Tier-2 ASes I am able to mea-
sure. This insight is significant because 1) it implies finer-granularity relationships
between ISPs than Gao-Rexford model; 2) as the preferences are configured through
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Default routes lead
Experiment Revealed to sites that
date preference Farther Same Closer Unknown
Dec. 26, 2018 349 61 219 64 5
Feb. 7, 2019 638 110 352 137 39
Mar. 10, 2019 553 87 291 95 80
Overall 1540 258 862 296 124
Table 5.4: Impact of preference between Tier-1s on anycast.
‘Local Pref’ and are considered before other rules, the “Shortest AS path” policy
might be applied less often than people expected, thus interdomain traffic engi-
neering that employs selective AS path prepending to redirect traffic may be less
effective. 3) the preferences do not conform to any previously conjectured rules for
tie-breaking when choosing providers.
5.2.3 Do preferences among Tier-1s affect anycast performance?
In the previous section, I show that relative preferences between Tier-1 ISPs exist
and are consistent across many customer ISPs. In this section, I evaluate how these
preferences between Tier-1s affect the performance of anycast.
Recall that in the route poisoning experiments, the PEERING testbed an-
nounces the prefix from servers in ten different locations. That is, the prefix is
anycasted. As described in Section 5.2, I collect packets towards the prefix from
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local host that is connected to PEERING servers. The local host sets up OpenVPN
tunnels between its TAP interfaces and servers. By identifying the TAP interface
each packet reached, I determine which server receives the packet. Thus, I can
compute the distance between the packet source (i.e., RIPE Atlas probes) and the
anycast servers they are directed to. For each of the route triplets collected in the
experiments, it contains routes from the same probe to PEERING servers in po-
tentially different locations. I examine if packets travel longer distance over their
default routes than over their alternate routes. If so, the relative preferences towards
default routes actually introduce path inflation.
Table 5.4 shows the number of routes triplets with preferred default routes,
and how many of the default routes lead to farther, the same or closer sites. It
summarizes the results from experiments in December 2018, February and March
2019. (For the other two experiments, in January and April 2019, the process col-
lecting packets on local host was interrupted and generated an incomplete set of
mappings between probes and their destinations.) I thus exclude those two ex-
periments in the evaluation. The table lists the number of triplets that revealed
preferences, which is the same as “Default not shorter” as in Table 5.2. Among
the preferred default routes, around 17% of them lead to farther sites compared to
their alternatives, while about 19% of them lead to closer ones. This result shows
that, fortunately, the relative preference between default and alternate routes cause
only a small portion of probes to reach out farther sites, and a little more probes to
use closer sites. Although unaware of routing performance, the policies behind the





Figure 5.5: Preference between Tier-1 ISPs revealed by ‘no-export’ community ex-
periments.
the inflation.
5.3 ‘No-export’ community experiment
5.3.1 Poison filtering in Tier-1 ISPs
In the route poisoning experiments, I reveal relative preferences between routes for
an AS and thus infer its preferences between its providers. BGP route poisoning
enables me to manipulate the routes for its inbound traffic to avoid any particular
AS in the upstream, but it has a major limitation: prior studies [83, 84, 112] have
shown that some ASes refuse to export BGP routes with poisoned ASes inserted,
especially when a Tier-1 is poisoned. In other words, route poisoning one Tier-1
ISP might cause multiple Tier-1s to dislodge their paths to the destination when
they receive the poisoned paths. The filtering of poisoned paths will not affect the
correctness of the observations of preferences for default paths, but it may damage
the completeness of the results because poisoning might fail to discover possible
alternate routes through Tier-1s that filter poisoned announcements. I conduct the
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174         
209         
286    
701          
1239          
1299         
2828         
2914          
3257         
3320         
3356         
5511         
6453          
6461           
6762          
6830      
7018         
12956     
Table 5.5: Routes that falsely include Tier-1 ASes, including poisoned routes, may
be filtered by other ASes to prevent misconfigured routes from being used.
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following experiments to demonstrate the poison filtering effect and estimate the
its impact on previous results. I perform traceroutes before and after I poison a
target Tier-1 ISP T. If the number of traceroutes that traversed another Tier-1 F
dramatically decreased (by 95% in the experiments), I conclude that the Tier-1 F
filters announcements with T poisoned. I use each of the Tier-1s as target ISP to
poison.
Table 5.5 illustrates which Tier-1s filter routes include which other Tier-1s. In
general, there is substantial collateral damage to poisoning a Tier-1 directly; There
is asymmetry in this table: for example, 5511 (Opentransit) filters any route that
includes any of the Tier-1s; not all Tier-1’s filter routes that include AS5511. Many
of route poisoning results thus rely on poisoning selected Tier-2’s (in the top 50 most
popular ASes) to cause Tier-1’s to look for (potentially longer) routes from peers.
5.3.2 Experiment design and results
In an attempt to recover the appearance of poisoning a Tier-1 directly, I designed
a complementary experiment that would use per-AS ‘no-export’ community tags
to control the routes towards PEERING. The experiments are similar to those in
Section 5.2, but instead of poisoning target ASes to avoid the default paths, I embed
‘no-export’ community tags for target ASes which effectively cause the target ASes
to dislodge their paths. These tags comprise the AS number being configured and
a code that specifies which peers should not receive the route. I obtained a list
of customized ‘no-export’ community tags that are public [113, 114]. It is atypical
97
for an AS to publish tags that are expressive enough to deny export to an AS’s
customers (not just peers) and are transitive; I found that only AS174, 3549, and
7018 published such tags.
As in the route poison experiments, I collect default paths from probes to the
PEERING prefix before sending BGP announcements with the ‘no-export’ commu-
nity tags, collect alternate paths after announcing the communities, and recovery
paths after re-announcing the original BGP announcements (without communities).
Although Streibelt et al. [115] found that most community tags propagate through
many ASes, my experiments require all routes received by a target AS to carry the
‘no-export’ tags to fully dislodge its routes to PEERING. I thus selectively announce
the prefix from only one PEERING server in Amsterdam to one transit provider
(Netwerkverening Coloclue, AS8283) that does not filter community tags. Even
though, filtering upstream of this AS may still interfere.
I apply the same analysis as in Section 5.2.1 to analyze the path triplets
obtained in the community experiments. In the experiments with community tags
from different Tier-1 ISPs, only the experiment that embeds ‘no-export’ community
of Cogent successfully causes it to dislodge its routes to PEERING. Figure 5.5
shows the relative preferences revealed by the ‘no-export’ community of Cogent.
Only one edge between Cogent (AS174) and GTT (AS3257) contradicts with edges
in Figure 5.4.
I believe that the community tag approach has potential where poison filtering
causes route poisoning to fail. Although it is possible to manually account for the
diversity of values needed to ask the AS to accept a ‘no-export’ route, and some
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have this support, community tags are not yet propagated widely enough, nor are
they typically powerful enough to substitute for poisoning.
5.4 Selective prepending experiment
The route poisoning and “no-export” community experiments reveal alternate paths
and relative preferences among Tier-1 ISPs when Tier-2 ASes select paths. The pref-
erences are presumably configured through ‘Local Pref’ and are considered before
the “Shortest AS path” policy. So the “Shortest AS path” rule might be applied
less often than people expected, when a unique preferable path is decided by the
relative preferences. As a result, interdomain traffic engineering [11] that employs
selective AS path prepending to redirect inbound traffic may be less effective.
Moreover, in many cases of the route poisoning and “no-export” community
experiments, unfortunately, the originally chosen path (Default) is shorter, and does
not conclusively reveal either AS preferences or selection via preference for “Shortest
AS path”. The prevalence of relative preferences between ASes may be underesti-
mated. In other words, there might be fewer Tier-2 ISPs than shown in Table 5.3
that choose default paths based on the “Shortest AS path”. Thus, I conduct the
following selective AS-path (un-)prepending experiments to discover how often the
































AT&T 4 3 6 3 3 4 4 3
COGENT 3 5 5 5 2 4 3 2
DTAG 2 3 6 3 3 4 4 3
GTT 3 3 6 3 6 6 6 6
KPN 2 3 4 3 3 4 3 3
LEVEL3 5 5 5 5 2 5 5 5
NTT 3 2 5 2 5 3 5 5
SPRINTLINK 5 2 5 5 5 5 5 5
SEABONE 3 3 4 3 6 6 6 6
QWEST 6 6 6 6 6 6 3 6
TELIANET 2 9 6 9 5 5 5 5
ZAYO 2 3 3 3 3 4 3 3
OPENTRANSIT 4 3 6 3 3 4 4 3
TATA 3 3 6 6 6 6
LGI 2 3 3 3
UUNET 3 6 6 6 6 6
Table 5.6: AS path lengths from Tier-1s to PEERING during selective prepending
experiment. Each column represents the site that does not prepend. Bold numbers
indicate routes directed to any of the prepending locations. Missing values indicate
that RouteViews (which may not include a direct peering) included no route through
the Tier-1.
5.4.1 Experiment design
PEERING allows researchers to repeatedly prepend origin AS in the advertised
paths at selective locations. This feature enables us to control the path length
received by ISPs (to a certain extent). I utilize this feature of PEERING and design
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the two-phase experiment:
• Prepend: In this phase, I prepend the origin PEERING ASN 47065 three
times in BGP announcements and advertise the prepended route to a single
transit provider of PEERING [116] from each of the 10 locations I use. I
do not announce routes to other transit providers other than the 10 selected
ones. Once again, I collect traceroutes from RIPE Atlas probes towards the
announced prefix and sample a set of 1,000 probes who traversed Tier-1 ISPs.
Using these probes, I conduct traceroutes to the PEERING prefix, which gives
me the paths chosen when routes are prepended.
• Un-prepend: Next I selectively advertise non-prepended routes to the transit
provider from one PEERING location each time, and still advertise prepended
routes from other locations. These BGP announcements provide shorter AS-
path length routes to some ASes. I then conduct traceroutes from the same
set of Atlas probes and collect un-prepended paths.
These path pairs (prepended, un-prepended) allows me to compare whether
path prepending makes a difference in how Tier-2 ISPs choose their upstream Tier-
1s. Upon un-prepending from each location, I use RouteViews and Looking Glass
servers [117, 118] in each Tier-1 ISP to identify the AS paths from Tier-1s to the
destination. The results are shown in Table 5.6. In that table, each column repre-
sents the PEERING location that does not prepend. Each row shows the Tier-1’s
AS path length to PEERING AS when different sites are un-prepended. Some ISPs









and no other T1s 96
but shorter exists 83
and no shorter 59
Table 5.7: Number of Tier-2s that changed path, that did not, and breakdown on
path length changes.
Opentransit) have identical path lengths regardless of prepending location, so the
preferences of a hypothetical customer of both would not be resolvable.
5.4.2 How often Tier-2s choose shorter paths?
Table 5.7 categorizes Tier-2 ISPs based on their behavior with selective prepending
at different locations. If the Tier-2 changes from its Tier-1 provider to another after
I un-prepended from any one location, I then examine if this new Tier-1 has shorter
path according to Table 5.6. If the new paths are shorter, it is likely that the Tier-2
employs “Shortest AS path” when selecting paths from its providers. As shown in
the “Change to shorter” column in Table 5.7, for those Tier-2s that changed paths
after un-prepending, 108 them change to shorter paths. “Change to same” and
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“Change to longer” shows the Tier-2s that make routing changes not due to the
shortest path policy, since they do not change (back) to a shorter AS path.
Some Tier-2 ISPs remain on the same paths even after un-prepending. This
could be because the Tier-2 had no other provider Tier-1 AS, had only longer paths
to other Tier-1 providers or applied a built-in higher local preference towards the
Tier-1 that it had chosen. I use AS-relationship dataset from CAIDA [93] to identify
Tier-1 providers for each Tier-2 ISP, and use Table 5.6 to examine if there exists
shorter paths from other Tier-1 providers available to the Tier-2. In table 5.7,
“Remain but shorter exists” show that 83 Tier-2s have shorter paths but chose to
remain with their default Tier-1 providers regardless of path length. I obtained
similar numbers for “Change to shorter” and in “Remain but shorter exists”. This
observation indicates that many Tier-2 ASes maintain relative preferences between
their Tier-1 providers. Local preference is prioritized ahead of path length in BGP
route selection process, and my results show that shortest AS path comes into effect
in only about 50% of Tier-2s that have the option to choose between Tier-1 providers.
5.5 Conclusion
The Gao-Rexford model [25, 26] provides a partial order of routes. When it cannot
determine the favorable route, it is commonly assumed that a route is selected among
the equal good ones by the “Shortest AS path” policy. The model and the assump-
tion is used in studies on analyzing network reliability [63], BGP convergence [64],
control of network traffic [65–67], and BGP security [69–71], etc. In previous chap-
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ters, I report that much of anycast inflation is due to poor route selections made by
ISPs among routes that are equally good in Gao-Rexford model.
In this chapter, I re-examine the assumption in tie-breaking routes: when
multiple equivalent routes are presented, do ISPs have a preference or do they choose
the shortest one? I used PEERING to develop three control plane experiments—
based on route poisoning, community tags, and route prepending—that allow me
to directly identify relative preferences among routes from all RIPE Atlas probes.
These set of experiments reveal that ISPs usually apply preferences towards
their providers before taking shortest paths. Moreover, I show that Tier-2 ISPs
have common and consistent preferences among Tier-1 ISPs, even when they have
the same provider-to-customer relations to most ISPs. This is a surprising result: I
expected these relative preferences among Tier-1s to reveal business relationships,
but it seems unlikely that virtually all Tier-2 ISPs would end up having the same
preferences.
Another significant insight from the results is that the “Shortest AS path”
policy might be applied less often because ISPs are likely to use local preferences
to tie-break in routes from their providers. I find only about half of the Tier-2s
choose shorter paths from Tier-1 providers. This observation suggests that selec-
tive AS path prepending as a traffic engineering method might not be effective for
many ASes, and motivates future studies on evaluating the effectiveness of AS path
prepending in traffic engineering.
In the end, I evaluate the effect of the newly discovered preferences to anycast
performance. Among the preferred default routes, around 17% of them lead to
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farther sites compared to their alternatives, while about 19% of them lead to closer
ones. Although the policies behind the relative preferences are probably unaware of
routing performance, they do not particularly increase (or reduce) anycast inflation.
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Chapter 6: Improving Anycast Performance
In this Chapter, I describe an extension to BGP announcement that fixes the ineffi-
ciency in anycast performance. With previous results, I show anycast path inflation,
which is usually caused by poor route selection, is generally larger than unicast path
inflation. Figure 4.4 reports that much of the performance deficit in anycast can be
recovered simply by tie-breaking better in route selection process, without violating
standard routing policies such as “Prefer-Customer”, “Prefer shorter AS-path” and
“Valley-Free”. However, BGP is policy-based and unaware of routing performance.
It lacks information to identify the route that provides better performance in terms
of latency or load balance in anycast. For this reason, adding more anycast replicas
or sites might not necessarily improve overall anycast performance, but in fact harm
the performance by making BGP selects the worse among more equal routes, as
shown in Figure 3.10a and 3.10b.
I will show in the rest of this chapter, that adding static information in BGP
announcements for anycast prefixes would be sufficient to recover much of the any-
cast performance deficit. Fortunately, BGP protocol is extensible and made to
support addition information in its announcements. Particularly, BGP community





















































































































































Figure 6.1: Benefits of geographic hints for different roots.
ing prefixes announced. BGP community is used for traffic engineering [121, 122],
mitigate attacks [122,123], and network troubleshooting [124,125]. The use of BGP
community has become popular by many ISPs in recent years [115]. I will describe
how to embed additional information of anycast sites who advertise the prefixes in
the BGP announcements, and evaluate how much this additional information can
fix the performance problems in anycast. Compared to other suggestions in anycast
deployment such as deploying all anycast sites behind a single upstream provider, or
measurement-based BGP optimization schemes, this proposed fix is incrementally
deployable and introduces little deployment and operation overhead.
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6.1 Static BGP hints
In this section, I describe a simple static “hint” that can be embedded in BGP
announcements, and show that such a static “hint” can provide large benefit to
anycast performance. Consider an extension in BGP announcements for anycast
prefixes that includes the geographic locations of sites reachable through the an-
nouncements. A BGP router would receive one or more BGP announcements, each
advertising one or more sites. When selecting routes, the BGP router may dis-
card some announcements based on standard policies such as “Prefer-Customer”.
Among the remaining announcements, the router will choose the one that advertises
the geographically closest site regarding to the router itself. (If multiple do, then
the router may choose one based on some other criteria or randomly.) The router
would then re-announce its chosen route to its BGP neighbors, as per usual. All
packets through the BGP router to the anycast prefix would be routed through this
chosen route to the geographic closest site.
I evaluate this geographic hint through simulation with real traceroute mea-
surements from experiments in §4.4. For each probe in the measurements, I identify
the “decision point” AS where the selection among routes to different sites hap-
pened. I then consider which sites would be listed in the BGP announcements for
different routes, and simulate the route selection process to pick the geographically
closest site to the decision point (not necessarily the closest to the probe).
My goal is to identify sites in geographic hints seen from the decision point
and choose the closest. I use “undns” [126] to track what locations the traceroutes
108
traverse, and infer what geographic hints are propagated to the decision point.
Consider the example in Figure 4.1, I found the probes’ traceroutes to laca and tojp
diverge at Los Angeles. According to the geo-hint, the route selected at the decision
point should be the one that leads to laca. I compute the latency difference between
the geo-hinted site and the chosen site, and characterize the benefits introduced by
this hint. Note that for some probes, I cannot obtain the latency to geo-hinted
sites. Suppose in the example shown in Figure 4.1, the decision point is located
at an anycast site hkcn, so the geo-hinted site is clearly hkcn. However, there is
no traceroute sent to hkcn in the measurements I collected, so the performance
difference between hkcn and the chosen site is not measured. For such probes, I
exclude them in the results. For C-root, 67 among 1541 probes have their geo-
hinted sites not measured; for D-root, there are 175 such probes out of 2785; for
K-root, there are 22 such probes out of 1398.
Figure 6.1 shows the latency improvements for queries to C-, D-, and K-root
would obtain using the static geographic list. x-axis is the latency difference; y-axis
is the portion or number of measured probes. Latency to D- and K-root both show
dramatic improvement. For D-root, about 1/3 of the probes improve latency by
50ms; for K-root, 23% do. The line for D-root shows a “step” behavior because
for some probes, the geo-hint helps avoid cross-continental or cross-oceanic links
K-root has a lot more global sites than D-root, and the latency improvements are
more evenly distributed.
There are “negative tails” in the results, which show that the geographic hint
does harm anycast performance in rare cases. Only about 11 probes (0.7%) for C-
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root, 201 probes (7.2%) for D-root and 83 (5.9%) for K-root are adversely affected.
Among those, 2 probes to C-root received 20ms+ increased latency; 57 probes for
D-root and 33 for K root. I further inspected the such probes and found in most
cases that such negative effects of geographic hints are caused by bad links between
the probe and geo-hinted, geographically nearby site.
The evaluation I conducted may underestimate the potential benefit of geo-
graphic hints. I obtain decision points from traceroute measurements to sampled
sites, while an exhaustive probing could add new decision points that could expose
a route to an better site. Also note that choosing the route towards the closest
site may not lead to actually using that closest site. For example, consider a route
that is advertised from an anycast site in Florida to an ISP in South America, and
should be chosen as the route to the geographically closest site. However, it might
be the case that the route traverses Virginia along the way, and the site in Virginia
is actually the one with lowest latency for the clients in South America. In my
evaluation, since I do not obtain traceroute towards Virginia site, the decision point
does not have information about the Virginia site, thus use the Florida site as the
geo-hinted site. This causes me to overestimate the latency to geo-hinted site, thus
underestimate the benefit of geographic hints.
A concrete implementation of the geographic hint in BGP announcements
would be embedding the information in BGP community tag. BGP community
tags have the format X:Y, where X, Y are two 16-bit values. By convention, the
first 16 bits are used to represent the AS number of the operator that sets the com-
munity. For the geo-hint, the last 16 bits can encode coarse latitude and longitude.
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Latitude varies -90 to 90, but inhabited latitude is more -50 to 74 [127] and can
thus be encoded in 7 bits. Longitude varies -180 to 180, so can be encoded in the
remaining 9 bits easily. Note that encoding location information in BGP community
tags is already used by many ISPs to record IXPs traversed by the BGP announce-
ments [125] or where the route is received [122]. Anycast sites would include the
community tags in out-bound advertisements, these tags would propagate as nor-
mal community tags do, and recipients would be allowed to choose to select routes
considering the proximity of the destination(s) encoded in the last 16 bits.
This static “hint” scheme has little overhead to BGP announcements, since
the geographic information is embedded in a 32-bits BGP community tag. When
selecting routes, it is computationally light for BGP routers to evaluate the distances
to anycast sites listed in the BGP announcements. More importantly, this scheme
is incrementally deployable. For each router that recognizes and evaluates such
geographic hints, it directs its traffic towards the geographically closest site to the
router. The traffic through the router will benefit from the hint, regardless of how
many other routers are configured to use the hint.
6.2 Other BGP hints
In the previous section, I evaluate how much benefit a static geographic hint would
provide to anycast. There are other forms of extensions in BGP announcements,
both static or dynamic, can be added specifically to anycast prefixes. For example,
another static hint is the number of sites reachable via the route in the announce-
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ment. Based on this number, BGP routers could choose the route that leads to the
most sites, and expect the closest among the many sites will be closer. This hint is
actually utilizing the idea of preferring the route leads to the common provider for
the most anycast sites, a generalization of Ballani’s suggestion of deploying anycast
with a single provider [18]. This hint is represented simply with an integer, intro-
duces minimal overhead to BGP announcements as well. But such a static hint may
suffer when the closer sites are not included in the route towards most sites.
On the other hand, dynamic hints based on local measurements of load or
latency through different routes, improve BGP’s route selection mechanism for not
only anycast prefixes but also unicast prefixes. But dynamic updates require exten-
sive measurements and more sophisticated algorithms to evaluate performance of
different routes.
The major advantage the proposed fixes, including the static hints, is that each
of them is incrementally deployable and compatible with current BGP policy. If the
hints are not recognized by some BGP router or even are removed, the performance
will fall back to that of current anycast under default BGP policy. Moreover, each
of the hints is flexible enough to allow additive usage in BGP announcements, and
different ISPs could apply their own route selection mechanisms to evaluate hints
independently.
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6.3 Propagation of the proposed BGP hints
In this section, I conduct experiments to evaluate whether the proposed fixes in BGP
community tags propagate well enough in the Internet to be used by distant ISPs.
I implemented an experimental anycast deployment on PEERING testbed [27]. As
described in Section 5.1.2, it allows researchers to announce prefixes from PEERING
servers in different locations. With the same prefix announced from ten locations,
the testbed implements an anycast deployment with ten global sites. Moreover,
PEERING allows a researcher to announce prefixes with customized BGP commu-
nity tags. For each server, which represents an anycast site, I embed specific code
(e.g., hash of the location city name) for it in the BGP community tags it announces.
I announce the prefix allocated to PEERING 184.164.249.0/24 (ASN47065) from ten
different locations including Amsterdam, Athens, Belo Horizonte (Brazil), Boston,
Clemson, Los Angeles, Phoenix, Salt Lake City and Seattle.
I characterize the propagation of community tags in BGP announcements by
collecting BGP routes towards the prefix announced from PEERING from 20 Route-
Views [128] BGP collectors. Among the 20 collectors, 11 of them received routes
with customized community tags from at least one route towards the prefix. The
fraction of routes to our announced prefix that have the community tags ranges
from 8% to 38% on the 11 collectors. Five collectors received tags from their closest
sites, i.e., they are presented with the routes to their closest sites. The other 5
received tags from their second closest replicas; another one is provided with tags
to the fourth closest replica. Note that by default, Cisco routers do not pass BGP
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community tags to their peers [129]. The results from this experiment are encourag-
ing: Many of the clients benefit from the geo-hints even with the BGP community
filtering as in today’s Internet.
To understand if the customized community tags from PEERING are treated
differently from BGP communities that are already used in practice, I further
characterize the propagation of community tags from other ISPs, including Server-
Central [130], Packet Clearing House [131] and Init7 [132]. I find similar propagation
of BGP communities from the measured ISPs as from PEERING testbed: 7 to 13
collectors received routes with community tags, and usually less than 50% of routes
received at the collectors contain community tags.
Recent work [115] on analyzing BGP community propagation confirms our
observations. Streibelt et al. [115] evaluated BGP community propagation by col-
lecting passive route collections from RouteViews and RIPE RIS, etc., and active
measurements from looking glasses and RIPE Atlas probes. They reported that
over 75% of all BGP announcements collected at more than 190 BGP collectors
have at least one community tag. Moreover, they found that over 50% of the com-
munities are propagated over four AS hops, so that the majority of communities are
propagated through the entire Internet.
6.4 Concerns on BGP community tags
BGP communities are widely used mechanism by network operators to manage
policy, engineer traffic or mitigate attacks. Results in this chapter show that a
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simple static hint in BGP community tags could significantly reduce anycast path
inflation. Unfortunately, BGP communities can also be exploited by adversarial
parties to influence routing in malicious ways.
Streibelt et al. [115] demonstrate with experiments in the real Internet that
many BGP community-based attacks, including remotely triggered blackholing, traf-
fic steering and route manipulation of prefixes from another ISP, are easy to achieve.
These attacks are feasible mainly due to the several weakness in current use and
implementation of BGP communities and community-based policies. First, BGP
communities effectively propagate in the entire Internet, as shown in my last section
and Streibelt’s work [115]. While their propagation allows network operators to
implement routing policies with additional information, it provides opportunities to
attackers to launch community-based attacks remotely, with or without hijacking
the target prefixes. Second, it is extremely concerning that inserting or modifying
BGP community tags in announcements requires no permission or authentication.
In general, the adoption of authentication in Internet protocols has been shown to
be a slow process. In addition, many BGP communities can be setup locally by each
ISPs and have no standardized semantic. As such, communities used for one ISP
may cause unintentional interference for others. The last but not least, there lacks
effective monitoring of the usage of BGP communities, and thus leaves the abuse of
community tags to grow.
The Internet community should take steps to address the major weakness in
the use of BGP community tags. To allow better use of BGP communities, espe-
cially those which are purely informative like the one proposed in this dissertation,
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the network operational community should standardize and publish well-known and
tested BGP communities semantics and best practice configurations. More impor-
tantly, cryptographic integrity and authenticity for BGP communities need to be
ensured in community-based services and policies. Current cryptographic mech-
anisms to protect the integrity and authenticity of routing announcement do not
cover BGP communities [133–136]. As BGP communities are increasingly popular
and widely used to embed various information, it is important to provide security
check mechanisms for them.
6.5 Conclusion
Prior studies provide surprisingly few suggestions on improving anycast perfor-
mance. Ballani et al. [18, 24] suggested deploy all anycast instances such that they
all share the same upstream provider. However, this solution requires extensive
of deployment changes for services that are not working under the deployment.
Moreover, it introduces a single point of failure, the common upstream provider, in
anycast, and makes anycast more vulnerable to interruptions in the provider.
In this chapter, I propose a fix to anycast performance deficit by adding static
geographic hints in its BGP announcements. BGP routers are able to identify the
routes going to the geographically closest anycast site through such static hints. ISPs
obtain estimates on performance of routes, and can thus tie-break more intelligently
among routes to different anycast sites. I evaluate the benefits of such static hints
by simulating the route selection process with real traces. The results show that this
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fix significantly reduces latency inflation for almost all clients, and reduces latency
by 50 ms for 23% to 33% of the clients of D-root and K-root. This proposed fix has
several advantages: it is incrementally deployable; it does not require deployments
changes; and it has little operation overhead.
To analyze the effectiveness of the fix in real Internet, I further evaluate the
propagation of the static hints embedded in BGP communities using PEERING
testbed. My results mostly reaffirm the observations by Streibelt et al. [115]: Most
ISPs forward BGP community tags they receive onward, and thus most BGP com-
munities are propagated globally. In the end, I discuss major weakness of BGP
communities and their usage in current Internet, and provide suggestions to the
Internet operators and research community to improve effectiveness and security in
BGP community-based services and operations.
117
Chapter 7: Conclusion
In this dissertation, I describe measurement-based methods to diagnose In-
ternet anycast, and provide fixes to improve its performance. While prior studies
found anycast can be inefficient, they provided little quantification on how bad the
inefficiencies are and how common it is for anycast deployments to experience the
performance problems. In Chapter 3, I provide a comprehensive and longitudinal
performance measurements of distinct anycast deployments. By measuring nine root
DNS servers and three major open DNS resolvers, I conclude that anycast, in most
deployments, is neither effective at directing queries to nearby replicas, nor does it
distribute traffic in a balanced manner. Furthermore, with longitudinal measure-
ment over 2 years, I show that performance of the most anycast deployments is not
improved over the time, even with dozens of new sites added for some of them.
To investigate the root causes for inefficiencies in anycast, in Chapter 4, I
develop novel measurement techniques to quantify the anycast and unicast path
inflation. I analyze the route selection process based on the standard BGP model to
understand what make ISPs to choose the routes to distant anycast sites. It turns
out much of the anycast inflation is due to ISPs do not have information to tie-
break more intelligently among seemingly equal routes. Although the performance-
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awareness is a known weakness of BGP, I quantitatively show that it is amplified
and causes more path inflation in anycast scenarios.
Based on the insights from Chapter 4, i.e., ISPs’ poor tie-breaking causes much
of the anycast inflation, I further investigate what are the route preferences they
have when tie-breaking. In Chapter 5, I design control plane experiments and use
large scale measurements to directly identify relative preferences among routes. My
results show that in about 30% of the cases ISPs do not tie-break randomly or with
“Shortest AS path”, but have preferences towards routes from certain providers. I
show that many Tier-2 ISPs have common and consistent preferences among Tier-
1 ISPs, even when they have the same provider-customer relations to most ISPs.
The newly discovered preferences provide useful complement to Gao-Rexford model
on BGP routing, and can help research community in various BGP-related stud-
ies. Also, our results indicate that about 50% of the Tier-2 ISPs do not choose
shorter paths from Tier-1 providers even when available. This observation suggests
researchers and network operators to re-evaluate the effectiveness of selective AS
path prepending as a traffic engineering method. Fortunately, I show that newly
discovered preferences do not cause additional deficits in anycast performance.
In Chapter 6, I provide suggestions to the Internet community on improving
anycast performance. I describe an incrementally deployable fix to the inefficiency
of anycast. With simulation on real network traces, I show that the fix can reduce
latency inflation for almost all clients. Overall, the proposed fix and all previous
results provide comprehensive understanding on anycast in today’s Internet. The
contributions in this dissertation help improve performance and reliability of critical
119
Internet infrastructure, and benefit global Internet users.
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Chapter 8: Appendix
In this appendix, I show the figures that illustrate the extra distance measure for all
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Figure 8.1: Distribution of RIPE Atlas queries to various DNS roots over additional
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Figure 8.2: Distribution of RIPE Atlas queries to various DNS roots over additional
distance (compared to their closest sites) traveled in March 2019.
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[77] Wolfgang Mühlbauer, Anja Feldmann, Olaf Maennel, Matthew Roughan, and
Steve Uhlig. Building an as-topology model that captures route diversity.
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, 36:195–206, 2006.
[78] Phillipa Gill, Michael Schapira, and Sharon Goldberg. A survey of interdomain
routing policies. Computer Communication Review, 44(1):28–34, 2014.
[79] Ruwaifa Anwar, Haseeb Niaz, David Choffnes, Ítalo Cunha, Phillipa Gill, and
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